

connect most strongly to curriculum theory/Didaktik. As we argued in part one, we think these two forms – regarding how education has developed with respect to global dimensions – are to be treated in connection to, and not disparate, from each other. In Part IV, we present chapters in which additional authors are attempting to connect curriculum/Didaktik and leadership in their work while Part V discuss nation-state education as a multi-level phenomenon.

Reference

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Chapter 2

Neo-liberal Governance Leads Education and Educational Leadership Astray

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Abstract The neo-liberal move to depoliticise and deregulate governance of public sectors by transferring them to the technocratic and administrative marketplace management endangers the political and democratic processes at all levels. It influences education and educational leadership at their very core: the purpose of education is shifting from intending to raise autonomous and critical participants in democracies, to aiming to produce an affirmative and employable workforce. This chapter analyses current developments in politics, administration and governance at state, municipal and institutional levels from a democratic perspective, and discusses concepts and practices of education and educational leadership with these same views. Two paradigms are described, in order to find the core of both kinds of theories: an outcomes-oriented, and a participation-oriented perspective. From a normative, democratic, viewpoint, it is argued that the core of each should be non-coercive relationships, developing deliberative practices in contemporary contexts is the main perspective in the chapter.

Introduction

It used to be self-evident that both the theory and practices of educational leadership and curriculum work are produced by societies, states and institutions. They are produced and developed in intricate networks by professional practitioners, policy makers and researchers with diverse backgrounds and with complex sets of interests. However, today we see that many governance ideas are borrowed from other systems. These borrowing industries want us to believe that ‘best practices’ and evidence of educational leadership and in education and teaching are of generic and global value. Two examples of this are the OECD understanding of ‘autonomy’ in governance and the PISA understanding of purposes and outcomes of education.

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This chapter will insist that the contexts in which theories and practices are developed are closely connected to the forms and content of those applied theories and practices.

Especially in times with groundbreaking changes in societies, states and institutions, such as the current epoch, it becomes more important to try and find the connections and the dis-connections between context, practices and theories. It may be claimed that we are in the midst of one of those basic changes, as national states are being made less important, and transnational agencies and global structures and discourses emerge.

The theoretical filters and concepts used in this work will heavily influence the analyses. The governance and neo-institutional perspectives have been chosen because they create opportunities to look into the relationships between, and coupling of societies, states, organisations and agents. This is also at the core of theories of education and educational leadership: how do societies and states wish to educate the next generations, and to organise and lead the organisations and institutions in which this is supposed to take place? The filter for these analyses is the particular understanding and interests of the author, so it is also very Danish and Nordic.

The main intention of this chapter is to analyse policies and theories of educational leadership and curriculum work/didactics that are active in the current situation, moving from one paradigm to another, from a participatory, democratic paradigm, towards a management-by-objectives and outcomes paradigm, and it intends to help us to be clearer and more transparent in our arguments, intentions and descriptions.

The starting point for this chapter is a series of analyses and a critique of aspects of neo-liberal marketplace policies. They form the actual framework and context for analysing and discussing leadership and education from a deliberative, democratic perspective.

A New Global Order When nation states were the institutions that were the only agencies responsible for taking care of shielding and protecting their citizens, property, production and trade by means of the army, juridical system, policy, and export and import duty until somewhere around World War II – to put this extremely briefly – the war taught many politicians and business leaders that trade across borders in international or transnational companies boosted economy and profits. Collaboration could sustain peace, security, production and the economy. This is one of the reasons that states gradually agreed to form alliances, such as defence alliances, one of which was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and economical alliances such as the World Bank, The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Globalisation grew into an intricate pattern of changes in economics and the global division of labour (e.g. the emergence of more than 50,000 massive transnational companies loyal to their shareholders, and therefore able to force govern-

ments to shape their financial policies according to market logic), changes in communication (especially the Internet and other forms of split-second, global mass media), changes in politics (with only one global political system remaining) and changes in culture (Martin and Schumann 1997). More recent areas of global interdependence are the financial market, and the climate and environmental problem. Thus, governments have tried to meet new challenges caused by transnational developments in forming transnational agencies or alliances, as mentioned before.

One global effect is the trend towards neo-liberal and marketplace politics in public governance (with a focus on decentralisation, output, competition, and strong leadership), as well as accountability politics (with a focus on recentralisation, centrally imposed standards and quality criteria, and on governing by numbers). This trend is known as neo-liberal New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991).

We know from research literature that is analysed in (Moos et al. 2015b) that the influence of transnational agencies, particularly of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), has been very visible in governance and education over the last 20 years (Hopman 2008). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the ways in which these influences have been interpreted and translated into national political cultures and policies (Antunes 2006; Lawn and Lingard 2002). One transnational document seems to have been particularly influential: 'Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD Countries' (OECD 1995). This was produced in accordance with the well-known OECD 'soft governance' strategy, the 'peer learning' method, by which member countries report trends in their public management to the organisation, where the complex picture is clarified and simplified, and trends and tendencies across countries are categorised into a smaller number of main categories:

1. Devolving authority, providing flexibility
2. Ensuring performance, control and accountability
3. Developing competition and choice
4. Providing responsive service
5. Improving the management of human resources
6. Optimising information technology
7. Improving the quality of regulation
8. Strengthening steering functions at the centre
9. Implementing reform
10. What next?

These themes were presented not as regulations or orders, but as recommendations from the OECD to member countries: national ministries could take, transform or ignore them (Moos 2009a). However, the language of the themes is extremely clear and informative, and reveals the OECD's neo-liberal political inclination (Moos and Paulsen 2014).

The recommendations meet country cultures, systems, traditions and politics, and are thereby transformed into new shapes and forms. The New Public Management

approach had already been born (Hood 1991), but with this report it was baptised, blessed and registered as a fully developed child of the OECD. Since then, it has been adopted and transformed into many different incarnations. These tendencies form underlying the foundations for most transformations in society, governance and educational systems (Moos 2006a). Thus, special attention should be given to these categories: (1) devolving authority, (2) ensuring performance and (8) strengthening steering functions at the centre.

Barriers between nations in the areas of economics, industry and trade, and culture and communication are being torn down, and new relationships and new coalitions and liaisons are being formed. Some of these new relationships are ad hoc; some are more formal. Most of them have been established primarily in order to promote economic cooperation. Over the past decades, some of the alliances and agencies mentioned above have expanded their activities from economics into other spheres of life, such as governance and education. Governance and educational systems are also being subordinated to market thinking. The primary objectives and charters of most of these agencies exclude them from making decisions about educational policies. Nevertheless, they have begun to focus on education, as it is often seen as a cornerstone for national and global economic growth in the so-called 'global knowledge economy' (G8 2006).

New State Model

The economy frames contemporary states and transnational agencies. An example of this is when Commissioner J. M. Barosso, in the European Commission's strategy, Europe 2020, presented the Grand Challenges to the economies, and not to the societies (Barosso 2010). This was pivotal in its influence on public sector governance and thus on education and educational leadership. An effect of this is that many Western nations have developed from being primarily welfare states to being competitive states (Pedersen 2010), over the past 30–40 years.

In the years following World War II (WWII) we saw the emergence of welfare states, where areas of civil society were taken over by the state, which would protect citizens and thus further social justice, political equity and economical equality. Full employment was a major goal, and the public sector was seen primarily as delivering services to citizens: for example, citizens were supported in case of unemployment or sickness.

The transnational agencies mentioned above have been driving forces behind the opening of national economies to global competition since the 1970s, with increasing power since the mid-1990s. Their economic aims shifted from growth through full employment and increasing productivity through the labour force and technology, to growth through international trade and investment. Increasingly, national governments are members of international organisations on the regional markets.

Moos (2014b) writes that beginning in the 1970s, governments started to turn economics in a neo-liberal direction built on rational choice ideology, increasing market influence and minimal state influence (e.g. deregulation, privatisation outsourcing). Citizens are seen less as citizens in a political democracy, and more as participants of the labour force with full responsibility for their situation, and as consumers. The public sector is seen primarily as serving production and trade in the national, innovative system. The state is influencing the availability and competence of the labour force and of the capital available. The competitive state is characterised (Pedersen 2010) as being regulating – by displaying best practices and budgets – by framing – the availability of a labour force, capital and raw materials – and by being an active state – by encouraging individual citizens to enter the labour market. Pedersen argues that, based on a number of decisions with regard to the labour market and membership in the EU that were taken in 1993, this year was a turning point in the Danish development from a welfare state to a competitive state. The effects on the educational system and discourses will be discussed later on.

New Governance Neo-liberal states develop new forms of governance and new technologies of governance (Peters et al. 2000) that rely heavily on the market as the logical basis for public policy, and that involve a devolution of management from the state to the local level, to local institutions (in the case of education, to self-managing or private schools), to classrooms (classroom management techniques) and to individuals (self-managing students). Foucault calls this a process of neo-liberal governmentalisation (Foucault 1991): governance presupposes agencies of management, but it also requires and gains the cooperation of the subjects involved. According to Foucault, this is the case in every modern society. What makes a difference is the logic or the rationale that seems to govern the fields. Governance and governmentality based on a management model are not legitimated by Weber's notion of legal-rational authority, but by a form of legitimacy or rationality that depends on market efficiency: 'No longer are citizens presumed to be members of a political community, which it is the business of a particular form of governance to express. The old and presumed shared political process of the social contract disappears in favour of a disaggregated and individualized relationship to governance' (Peters et al. 2000). People are transformed from autonomous citizens to choosers or consumers of services, as is the case in New Zealand and many other countries, where people are free to choose schools for their children (Marshall 1995). The fundamental principle at the heart of management ideology is 'freedom of choice', whereas a political perspective would stress the possibility of involvement, being a member of a community that could discuss and influence decisions.

The tendency towards more market and less state means that political logic is being replaced by capitalist logic, and that one logic is going to regulate all spheres of life.

Two Systems States, governance and leadership are, as mentioned, subject to influences from the transnational agencies, in this case, primarily the OECD and the

European Commission (EC). However, the effects of the influences vary, because traditions, structures and discourses are different. In order to illustrate this, here is a short account of differences in selected features of the UK/US and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) that are of immense importance to governance, education and the development of educational theories and practices. Here we will limit ourselves to a few pivotal values and discourses with consequences for the emergence of ideas and practices of schooling: the idea of state, schools and education. As mentioned, in the Nordic countries we see the development of the state from being first and foremost a welfare state to becoming a competitive state (Pedersen 2011), equipped to participate in the global competition for market shares in all areas of society. This development entails changes in the view of what is the optimal relations between state and individual, the governance; it brings changes in the dominant discourses on education and of the purposes of education, and it brings changes in the ideas of the best possible school organisation.

In the following sections we will sketch out some of the general ideas about important features in Nordic societies and in the UK/US, as they looked in the era from World War II until 1980s. This period has been chosen because many general ideas and practices were developed as part of ‘a new beginning’ following WWII, but also because they still live on in the discourses and practices today (Moos 2013).

We present indicators of core contemporary societal and educational values in Nordic education and compare them with core values in Anglo-American systems.

Relations among state, market and individuals

Proponents of the Nordic welfare states believed in a strong social democratic state and a well-regulated marketplace. The UK/US believed in a liberal state where the market was only minimally regulated by the state. We have chosen the following indicators of prevailing values to illustrate Nordic similarities and US/UK differences: GINI index, confidence in national institutions, trust, power distance and state funding of schools’.

The GINI index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Thus a GINI index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality: The Nordic GINI is 27 out of 100, indicating a high level of equality. The UK/US GINI is 38 to 41 of 100, meaning less equality (WorldBank 2015).

Confidence in national institutions is slightly higher in the Nordic countries: 65–75%, whereas in the UK/US it is 65–68% (OECD 2012b). The level of confidence is similar in Nordic countries and the UK/US.

Trust data are based on the question: ‘Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’ Thus, trust reflects people’s perception of others’ reliability: in Nordic countries trust among most people was 84–89%, and in the UK/US it was 49–69% (OECD 2011).

The power distance in Denmark was 51 of 53; in the UK/US it was 40 of 53 (Hofstede 1980).

School Organisation: The main school model in the Nordic countries was the comprehensive, non-streamed public school, while the UK/US school was more often privately funded, divided and streamed. One indicator of the importance attached to schools is the level of state funding: state funding of education is 98–100% in the Nordic countries, while it is 79–92% in the UK/US (OECD 2012a).

Dominant educational discourses: Nordic legislation and the dominant discourses have focused on a comprehensive school and an education for democratic Bildung, participation and equality, not only post-WWII, but for most of the twentieth century. In the UK/US in the same era, we saw a very strong tendency to emphasise a scientific curriculum with a focus on national aims and measurable outcomes (Blossing et al. 2013).

A compact overview

	Nordic indicators	UK/US indicators
GINI	27 of 100	38–41 of 100
Confidence in national institutions	65–75%	65–68%
Trust	84–89%	49–69%
Power distance	51 of 53	40 of 53
State funding of schools	98–100%	79–92%

It is reasonable to conclude that the UK/US had societal and political systems more inclined to build on rational choice theories, because of the belief in a liberal and weak state; on principal-agent theory, because of the greater power distance and GINI, and lower trust in other people; and on market thinking, because of the stronger belief in civil society and market. Thus, the UK/US seem better equipped to take in the transnational ideas of New Public Management.

Influences from Supra- and Transnational Agencies

The OECD and EU Commission (EC) are two powerful players in the global field of educational politics. Until now, they have not been positioned to make educational policy decisions on behalf of member governments. However, this may change with respect to the EU because of the Lisbon Agreement. National policies are influenced by supranational European Union policies ‘that create, filter and convey the globalisation process’ (Antunes 2006 p. 38). This influence is one of the purposes of the EC, but not the purpose for which it was originally intended. In the Lisbon Agreement, education is defined as an aspect of social services, and therefore falls within the range of Commission decisions and regulations (EC 2000).

Since both the OECD and EC – and their member governments – were interested in international collaboration and inspiration, they developed alternate methods to influence the thinking and regulation of education in member states. The EC devel-

oped the ‘open method of coordination’ (Lange and Alexiadou 2007), and the OECD developed a method of ‘peer pressure’ (Moos 2006b; Schuller 2006).

The EC needed governance tools to influence public and private education within the member states. At the Lisbon EC meeting, participants agreed to develop a flexible method based on reflexivity and indicators. According to the meeting, this method had to include flexible governance tools that rely on ‘soft law’. The divide between hard and soft law may be explained in this way: through hard law and directives, the EC is able to create regulations, legally binding obligations for states and individuals, whereas soft law may only be persuasive. The second feature of the open method is reflexivity: member states and institutions should inspire each other through ‘peer reviews’ and policy learning, such as best practices. An important tool is a set of indicators that was described in order to enable the identification of ‘best practice’ (Lange and Alexiadou 2007). Another very important tool is the Bologna Process of Higher Education, initially a project of homogenisation of higher education established by the European Ministers of Education in 1999, but later taken over by the EC.

CERI (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation) is the OECD bureau that manages education and educational research. The OECD does not see itself as, nor was it established to be, a federal or super-state with regulatory authority over its 30 sovereign member countries. Therefore, it has no formal power over member countries. However, the OECD/CERI was established as a powerful player in the globalisation of economies, and thereby, the restructuring of the nation states (Henry et al. 2001). Through this restructuring, it influences the policies and practices of member countries in ways other than regulatory means.

Both the EC and the OECD function in accord with the decision of the WTO’s GATS agreement (WTO 1998) to include education services in the areas of free trade, thus transforming education into a commodity (Moos 2006b; Pitman 2008, 27–28 November). These influences on policy and practices, such as decision-making, are not linear and straightforward. Lingard (2000) describes them as ‘mutually constitutive relations’ between distinctive fields, or spaces. Lawn and Lingard claim that transnational organisations such as the OECD act as shapers of emerging discourses on educational policy as ‘expressed in reports, key committees, funding streams and programmes’ (Lawn and Lingard 2002). The main influence comes from the OECD setting the agenda (Schuller 2006), both within the whole organisation – for example, international comparisons such as PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) (Hopman 2008) and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) – and within individual member nations. If a government wants to add an issue to the agenda, but lacks the ability to do so on its own, it can call on the OECD for help. The OECD then forms a team that reviews the state of affairs in the member state, based on a detailed and comprehensive framework designed by the OECD. The team’s report often forms the basis for political action taken by the states. The review of educational research and development in Denmark is a relevant example (Moos 2006b). This strategy is explicated in the OECD publication, Education Catalogue (OECD 1998), as the

strategy of ‘peer pressure’, which ‘encourages countries to be transparent, to accept explanations and justification, and to become self-critical’ (Ibid, p. 2).

Both the OECD and the European Commission distinguish between ‘hard governance’ and ‘soft governance’. The choice of terms is interesting, because hard law stands for regulations that influence people’s behaviour, while soft law/governance influences the way people perceive and think about themselves and their relationships with the outside world. Therefore, soft governance influences agents in much deeper ways. While these methods of influence may seem softer, in a sense, more educational, the effects of soft influence are harder and more profound. Governments and other authorities become ‘leaders of leaders’ through those indirect forms of power that produce ‘conduct of conduct’ – shorthand for Foucault’s concept of governance (Foucault 1976/1994; Sørensen and Torfing 2005). These indirect forms are intended to influence the ways in which institutions and individuals perceive, interpret, understand and act. The values and norms are most important from a governmental point of view.

As mentioned above, analyses of governance in contemporary modernity show a general trend: Transnational agencies, government at the national and local levels, and agents at practical levels are increasingly attempting to use indirect forms of power, such as discourse, agenda-setting, sense-making and social technologies, instead of direct forms, such as prescriptions and instruction. Societies have become so complex that direct forms of power have become ineffective, because surveillance, control, and sanctions are impossible to implement, and because they are often not seen as legitimate forms of influence in democracies. Thus, there is a shift away from hard governance by regulation, towards soft governance by persuasion.

We see several examples of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) among transnational, national and local institutions, such as agencies, governments and schools, based on coercion through political pressure, on mimicry of successful examples/practices, or on the transfer of norms through professional communication.

Governance and Leadership

Leadership and governance are at their very core about influencing institutions and agents through the use of forms of power. A working set of categories is: (a) regulatory leadership (e.g. regulations, legislation, direct use of power and sanctions), (b) discursive leadership and social technologies (e.g. societally constructed and naturalised as norms, discourses, strategies), and (c) reciprocal leadership (e.g. negotiations, dialogues, mediations and sense-making and enactment processes) (Moos 2009b; Moos et al. 2015a; Schmidt 2008).

Based on Foucault’s post-structural perspective, influence and power may be described as a network of relationships where the poles (the agents) are defined by the relationships of which they are a part. For example, the special relationship

between motherhood and childhood defines the mother and her child. The mother would not be a mother without a child, and vice versa. Another example is that of prisoners and their guards. The relationship, not the poles, defines the aspects of power and influence. Therefore, power is productive and relational. Influence is communication between a minimum of two poles/agents (Foucault 1983).

Pivotal situations, where influence and power are being used for leadership purposes are decision-making processes. As mentioned above, at the core of this concept of leadership is the notion that leadership does not consist of the actions of the leaders per se, but the interactions between leaders and other agents. Therefore, leadership is 'an influencing relation' between leaders and followers that takes place in situations (that may be described by their tools, routines and structures). Leadership is performed through interactions and communication that influence, and that are understood to influence other persons. This 'influence through communication' concept is parallel to Spillane et al.'s understanding of the interaction concept (Spillane et al. 2001, 2004), because both focus on the relations between leaders and teachers. The actions of the leader are only interesting if they are understood as leadership actions by the followers or co-leaders.

In principle, leadership decision-making may be understood as a three-phase process: there is (1) the production of premises for decision-making (sense-making or setting the scene); it is (2) decision making itself, and it is (3) the connections to decisions that are being made by followers (Moos 2009a).

In the first phase of decision-making – construction of premises – influence is present because of the way in which premises are defined or produced, and by whom: Who (individuals, groups, institutions) defines the situation or the problem at hand? How is the dominant discourse on which decisions and actions are based created, or how is 'the definition of reality' constructed? (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 1976; Meyer and Scott 1983; Røvik 2007; Schmidt 2008; Sørensen and Tofting 2005).

It is important to distinguish between agent-driven and structural influences: There are a number of ways that individual agents or groups of agents can influence the minds and interpretations of other agents. They may set an agenda (Barach and Baratz 1962), influence sense-making and set the stage (Stacey 2001; Weick 2001), and enter into educational activities, negotiations, or other interactions (Spillane and Orlina 2005).

Secondly, decision-making is a complicated procedure involving the selection of accepted and sufficiently important premises that are influential enough to be taken into account. Individuals or collectives of agents may make decisions. Decisions may also result in a new agenda for discussing or making decisions about the field, or for the description and regulation of new behaviours. Decisions are often built into structures: legislation, societal, social and financial frameworks. Institutions are constructed because of political processes and power struggles that have sanctions attached to them. The agents' forms of direct power also have the possibility of sanctions being attached to them. However, none of these forms can guarantee results unless they are viewed – or even identified – as legitimate forms by the people and groups affected by them. On the other hand, decisions construct the pre-

ises for new decisions. This construction is the case with leadership decisions that form the premises for employer decisions.

The third major phase of influence is the connection phase. Inspired by decision-making and communications theories (Thyssen 1997), a communication is only viewed as an effective communication if it 'irritates' the other pole to such a degree that it chooses to connect, to stop and reflect on, and possibly alter, their reflection processes and practices. Whether or not the other agent is connecting may be difficult to detect, since some reactions may occur long after the 'irritation' has taken place. On the other hand, there is no point in talking about influence without effects. If an act of law does not change anything concerning citizen behaviour, or if army privates do not follow a colonel's orders, then we cannot talk about real influence. The ways in which connections are made becomes an important feature of the construction of premises for future decisions.

An area of connections is constituted by evaluations and assessments. The broad field of evaluation and assessment is currently undergoing basic transformations. National as well as local systems and organisations need documentation for the use of resources in the organisations in their jurisdiction. An important aspect of the hunt for transparency involves finding out to whom agents and organisations should be accountable, and for which values they should be accountable. Schools must answer to a range of different forms of accountabilities including marketplace accountability that focuses on efficiency and competition, bureaucratic accountability that focuses on outcomes and indicators, political accountability that focuses on citizen satisfaction and negotiations, professional accountability that focuses on professional expertise, and ethical accountability that focuses on social justice (Firestone and Shippis 2005; Moos 2008). Schools must simultaneously answer to all these forms of accountability, consequently creating numerous dilemmas for schools and school leaders (Moos 2014b).

It is interesting to look at the deliberative and participative opportunities for leaders and teachers primarily because there are clear links and connections between the conditions that teachers have, and the conditions and frameworks that schools and teachers give students so they can develop a 'democratic Bildung'. This kind of Bildung is not only a matter of knowing about democracy, it is more a matter of acquiring democratic patterns of interpretation and democratic ways of life (Beane and Apple 1999; Dewey 1916/2005). Therefore, a 'democratic Bildung' must include the possibility of testing those interpretations and ways of living in real life (Moos 2011).

The concept of leadership as both influence and of decision-making is, as described here, built on the notion of relations and communication forming the very core of the understanding.

Acts of law and societal and discursive structures are institutionalised influences, some of which are called social technologies: routines, methods, work forms, and tools may all be used as social technologies, that is, technologies with a purpose or meaning (Dean 1999; Foucault 1991; Rose 1999/1989). These are used to influence people's norms and cognitive processes. They embody hidden decisions and influences from other places or other times, and form the premises for decision-making.

Some of these technologies evolve from daily practices, while others are imposed or applied from outside actual practice. These methods might change over time, but at any given moment they are perceived as the ‘natural way’ of working. As they are not discussed, the power invested in them is concealed. Other social technologies are brought to the field of practice from the field of business life or from educational policy, often described as ‘natural’ or ‘neutral’ tools for practitioners to use. Here again, power is concealed, and therefore not discussed (Moos 2008). Therefore, in any setting, social technologies are powerful but silenced forms of power (Moos 2009b). The forms of power may also be compared to Scott’s regulative, cognitive/cultural and normative pillars of institutions (Scott 2001, p. 77).

Social Technologies: Governing by Numbers

The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) comparison has been imported into the European space as an important means of governing education (Moos et al. 2015b). It is in one package producing standards or indicators for learning, measurements for outcomes and tools for comparing students, schools and countries. This is not unexpected, as an OECD working paper shows (Wilkoszewski and Sundby 2014). This is a report on the use of a tool in the European Commission’s ‘open method of coordination’ toolbox, the country-specific recommendations, presented in a comparison of three countries’ cases of ‘Steering from the centre – new modes of governance in multi-level education systems’.

Both the OECD and EC are working with the global trends to develop a new model of, and paradigm for governance of education. The central theme is that policymakers and practitioners should build on the quantitative sciences (of which psychometric comparisons are seen as a part), rather than the traditional, qualitative science of educational philosophy. These processes are called, ‘The Political Work of Calculating Education’ (Lawn and Grek 2012). Statistics becomes the science of the ‘numerical study of social facts’ and the foundation for the emergence of ‘governing by numbers’ (Nóvoa 2013). That means de-ideologising and objectivising governance, leadership and education, making it possible to treat social facts as things (Desrosières 2000, page 122). Over the past century, this development has been the background for the emergence of a new group of experts in the educational field: experts in statistics and psychometrics. Politicians and policymakers are particularly interested in their work, as numbers are seen as the best and cheapest foundation for political and governance decisions. This trend is often called an ‘evidence-based policy’.

When we take the foregoing observations together with the observation that the major tool, PISA, is actually measuring, what is not taught (Labaree 2014). National tests normally attempt to measure the outcomes of teaching in relation to national aims and standards. PISA was constructed as a tool that could facilitate a comparison of national outcomes across 20–30 different national educational systems. These national educational systems had their particular and very different sets of

national aims and standards: therefore, a unified set of curricular aims was impossible. Thus, PISA constructed an independent, transnational set of aims: 'skills to meet real-life challenges'. Those aims are skills that productive workers anywhere in the advanced world would need. So the OECD reduced learning to the acquisition of economically useful skills – for employability. In order to be able to compare outcomes, a set of aims and skills was produced that are actually taught nowhere (Labaree 2014).

PISA is more economically focused than is usually acknowledged. This should be no surprise, as the OECD is the originator of the neo-liberal new public management system of thinking and governance (OECD 1995). Measuring outcomes, and in particular, outcomes along one global set of criteria, is a very powerful technology of soft governance. As time goes by, politicians, policymakers and professionals become accustomed to this, to thinking that this is the 'new normal'. As has already happened in so many ministries and local administrations, we will see a homogenisation of views on education, on the dominant discourses of education. This is like the old saying, 'You get what you measure – and only that'. That is basically economically defined and excellently calibrated to a technocratic and economic administration.

Meta-Governance, Social Technologies and Self-Governance: New Public Governance (NPG) In our study of Nordic superintendents (Moos et al. 2015b), we found that there are strong tendencies towards what we called 'governments bypassing the municipal level in matters of education'. The straight governance chain from government through municipal authorities to schools is rather unbroken, when it comes to finances and administration, but when it is about education – setting aims, developing means and measuring outcomes – the Nordic governments circumvent the municipalities (except for Finland): The aims for education and learning are being more detailed. The measurements follows through international and national tests and the means are developed on the basis of social technologies, presented by the ministry as advice to schools.

This situation fits nicely with the concept of a mixture of meta-governance and self-governance. Meta-governance involves implementing financial and legislative frameworks and initiating discursive governance. It is a form of governance that does not resemble governance: it imposes frameworks and attempts to influence discourse, yet delegates actual governance activities to various levels. Important tools of this kind of governance are social technologies such as standards and testing, quality reports and student plans, regular staff appraisals and budget models (Moos 2009a). Through various frameworks, as well as soft governance (Moos 2009b), the government encourages local authorities and individual institutions to produce and find their own identity as an institution (March and Olsen 1976) with their own specific aims, meanings and accountability. On the other hand, self-governance (Foucault 1983) means that institutions can – and are willing to – govern themselves in self-governing institutions and networks. Some decisions are made at state level, while others are delegated to lower levels, creating new relations between policymakers, and civil servants and various combinations of these members at all levels.

In an overarching way, ministries and their agencies are still in control of purposes, aims, frameworks and organisation, since they make use of regulative forms of governance (legislation, regulations, economic frameworks, etc.) (Scott 2014). They set the goals and monitor the outcomes. However, for some areas of responsibility they have delegated decisions on how to achieve these goals and outcomes to lower-level agencies and to institutions. It is important to underscore the fact that the governments intend to keep a firm hand on issuing aims and measuring outcomes, ‘steering from the centre’ as the OECD called it in the 1995 report (OECD 1995). This produces a special form of self-governance: the neo-liberal, Panopticon form (Foucault 1961/1972; Foucault 1972), where the agents take over their own steering and monitoring, because they expect that they are being monitored, even if they cannot see a guard.

In all the Nordic countries, there are clear tendencies towards meta-governance when it comes to educational aims, accountability programmes and overarching financial frameworks for municipalities. Operations, human resource management and educational practices are, to some degree, left to self-governance by the practitioners in the workplace. However, the steering is left to practitioners to only a certain extent, because Ministries continuously attempt to influence reflection and practice through quality-assurance initiatives with clear national standards or indicators, and through monitoring and assessment of outcomes.

Education Is Also About Content

A general and ground-breaking analysis of education and student learning, write Moos et al. (2015b) with reference to Rømer et al. (2011), distinguishes between pure education, found in evidence-based and best practices, for example, and, on the other hand, impure education, described as follows:

The impure education is an education where methods of education cannot be separated from the content and the anchorage in cultural, ethical and political processes. (p. 7)

The argument is that in education one cannot separate form from content. It is an eternal and very old discussion in philosophy, dating back to Plato and to Kant. The proponents of impure education hold that one cannot separate the learning processes from the content, the object of learning. However, the separation of content from form is very common in contemporary educational policies, where learning has become the individual student’s endeavour to lead and monitor her/his own learning processes. This is often labelled ‘meta-learning’: learning to learn, which may be supported through various methods of cognitive empowerment. In this understanding, students do not need a teacher or learning material, such as textbooks. They need to acquire only a set of cognitive learning strategies.

However, theories such as those of Dewey’s and Brinkmann’s (Brinkmann 2011; Dewey 1929/1960) hold that learning is not exclusively an academic, cognitive practice, but is also about establishing habits through non-verbal signals and con-

crete manipulations with real objects and people. One learns in the interplay between student, teacher and content. Here, both academic and social learning take place, because all parties try to make sense of the information, the situation and the relations. Here, students also form their social identities, as aspiring members of the learning community of practice (Wenger 1999).

Making exclusive use of the social technologies mentioned above would exclude both the content and the relational aspects of learning. The social technologies describe procedures, in forms that are intended to be applicable in all similar situations. Therefore, they do not include the actual practice and situation, the actual people and learning objects involved in learning (Brinkmann 2011). The technologies make us forget that education, teaching and learning are, as also are all levels of leadership, very practical processes: students learn something when they manipulate objects and take part in communication, sense-making and enacting. School leaders and superintendents lead – they plan, they manage, they arrange, discuss, and negotiate real-life situations, challenges and problems. Budgets and strategies are not solely words on paper, but thoughts about actual schools, teachers and students. Therefore teachers as well as leaders need to be in close contact with the objects of their practices, both students and staff, so that they can interpret and act on both clear and weak signals about the practice processes.

The discussion looks very similar when we talk about educating students, leading schools and governing educational systems. Individualisation is spreading into more and more fields and levels. Both challenges and practices of course differ from level to level: what is meta-learning in the classroom is self-governance in schools and in municipal governance. But the basic understanding of what is needed is very much the same – or rather, should be the same – because all three levels of education work in pursuit of the general, overarching purpose of educating the next generation to take over, eventually. The superintendent strives to provide education in schools with the best of opportunities and frameworks. The school leader does the same at the school, as does the teacher with the class, groups of students and the individual students. However, the use of these internationally-inspired social technologies seems to determine the societal, cultural and political discussion of what they are there for. And the answer to that question is, for the purpose of schooling and upbringing. But the discussion of the upbringing and education of the kind of human beings to which society and schools want to contribute is often absent from discussion in the national contexts and obscure in the international context (Biesta 2009; Moos 2014a, b; Rømer 2011). The OECD has no public vision of a general *Bildung* with strong educational ties to history, ethics and culture; it issues directives related only to the question of skills required for the labour market.

School Leadership Functions In order to further explore concepts of school and educational leadership, we will look at the tasks and functions that school leaders are supposed to take care of. The first perspective will be that of the OECD, again, because it has had a great impact on the governments' thinking. In the *Improving School Leadership Report* (Pont et al. 2008), the functions are summarised into three categories, each with each three subsets.

1. *School autonomy with:*

- (a) 'Running a small business'
- (b) Managing human and financial resources
- (c) Adapting the teaching programme

2. *Accountability for outcomes with:*

- (d) A new culture of evaluation
- (e) Strategic planning, assessment, monitoring
- (f) Use of data for improvement

3. *Learning-centred leadership with:*

- (g) New approaches to teaching and learning
- (h) Supporting collaborative teaching practice
- (i) Raising achievement and dealing with diversity

The main concepts being used are clearly taken from areas of economy, (1a) and (1b), and governance, (2b) and (3c), with an emphasis on information technologies and number technologies, (2a), (2c) and (3c), and thus are very much in accord with the general governance trends, seen from the neo-liberal OECD kind of soft governances. Therefore, it does give advice to political and administrative managers, and not to school leaders. They are not given advice as to what to do, and how they may lead their schools.

Another approach would be to look at the findings of a big meta-study (Leithwood and Riehl 2005) of school leadership. Here, they found that four main categories of leadership functions were apparent in almost all contexts:

1. Setting the direction for the school with a focus on student learning
2. Seeing and empowering teachers
3. Structuring and culturing the organisation
4. Legitimising the school to the community

The first issue is very principal-agent driven: The principal sets the direction. In a participative, democratic setting one would phrase it differently: Leadership is setting and negotiating directions, making internal sense: even though schools in some systems are managed in some detail when it comes to outcomes (standards, inspections and tests), they have to find ways to achieve these outcomes themselves. They have to interpret demands and signals from the outer world and choose the means by which they want to respond to them. It is a major challenge to school leadership to interpret signals and make them into discourses and narratives, communications about differences, which form the premises for the next decisions in the community (Thyssen 2003a, b; Weick 1995, 2001).

The second issue acknowledges the fact that school leaders have no direct influence on student learning, as they do not participate in the daily interactions with students. Teachers do that, and therefore they need to be given the conditions in which to carry this out. They also need to be included in the school's educational community, and participate in maintaining and developing it. There are at least two

reasons for that: they need to be part of, and sympathetic to the directions chosen in the school in order to contribute to a shared educational practice, and that is the second argument.

The third issue is acknowledging that learning, teaching and leading take place in organisations that need to be organised in ways that allow teachers and leaders to function in the best ways possible. One prerequisite for this is a focus on the integrity of the organisation: the ability for it to be both a convincing internal work- and life-framework, and to appear reliable in the eyes of all stakeholders. Inspiration for discussing community and membership may be drawn from Etienne Wenger's theory of how learning and identities are constructed within communities of practice (Wenger 1999). Identity construction is a dual process in a field of tension between our investment in various forms of belonging and our ability to negotiate the meanings that matter in those different contexts. The production is partly identification (investing the self in relations) and partly negotiability (negotiating meaning).

The fourth issue reminds us that schools are parts of larger systems, such as societies and communities, such as political and governance systems, and such as educational and cultural systems. It is important that schools acknowledge these systems in ways that may secure their support and acceptance. So, they can find them legitimised (March and Olsen 1976).

Organisation or Organising

Many theories are concerned with understanding and analysing organisations. Here, only one will be presented, because this new institutional understanding is in line with the general understanding of governance, leadership and education in this chapter: the core of all of them is communication and relations.

An organisation is a network of intersubjectively shared meanings that are sustained through the development and use of a common language and everyday interactions (Moos 2011s p. 38; Moos et al. 2015b; Walsh and Ungson 1991; Weick 1995).

Agents negotiate membership in a community as they share the meanings of relationships and tasks. Community and affiliations emerge in day-to-day interactions and communication.

The sense-making processes between school leaders and teachers are pivotal, because they can and should serve as models for the sense-making processes throughout the whole school. Sense-making takes place in many forms of communication, language and behaviour, interactions and communication. The sense-making focus on language that has been at the forefront for some time should be supplemented. We need to focus more on what Weick (1988) describes 'enactment': the notion that when people act, they bring structures and events into existence, and put them into action. Weick uses this term in the context of sense-making by managers or employees. He also describes how they can enact 'limitations' on the system, to avoid unwanted issues or experiences. This too is seen as a form of social con-

struction, focusing more on the actions we want to take in a given situation, and their materiality – for example, an agent's mimes, body language – as well as the purposes and organisational context of the interaction in which the communication takes place, and the content of the communication.

According to Weick et al. (2005), sense-making is communication through words and action that builds on the interactions that school leaders and teachers have experienced and undergone when 'the flow of action has become unintelligible' (2005, p. 409), and when external expectations seem strange and unintelligible, and there is a need for explanations and defence: What happened? What did I/we do? How can this be interpreted and understood? A similar argument is made by Vivien A. Schmidt (2008), when she discusses discursive institutionalism: Discourses are ideas in institutional contexts and interactions. Some of them are communicative discourses that emerge in the interactions between agents, when they are arguing for a given course of action. Therefore, deliberation is essential and at the core of discourse (Uljens and Ylimaki 2017).

The argument is similar to arguments about distributed leadership, made by Spillane and Woods et al. (Spillane and Orlina 2005; Woods 2004; Woods et al. 2004). They write that distributed leadership may take many forms. At the core of their concept of leadership is the notion that leadership does not lie in the actions of the leaders per se, but the interactions between leaders and other agents. Therefore, leadership is a relationship of influence between leaders and followers that takes place in situations (which may be described by their tools, routines and structures). Leadership is about interactions that influence and that are understood to influence other persons.

The basis for sense-making and for enactments is the life-world (Coburn 2004) of each participating group and individual. Life-worlds differ because of differences in background, experience, position and interests. This means that the positions, training and prior experiences of school leaders matter.

Weick's concepts of sense-making and enactment (Weick 2001) are often linked to face-to-face, real-time interactions and communications. As the distance between agents such as school leaders and teachers in contemporary Nordic schools grows so they seldom or never actually meet, they find it difficult to relate their understanding to other agents and communities, and correspondingly have a greater need to relate to regulations, norms, manuals and so on, that are transmitted in writing. This means that they have to operate at a more general level. They cannot, as in reciprocal, face-to-face encounters and deliberations, describe particular or specific situations, contexts and content. Therefore, we see the introduction of numerous social technologies that are intended to guide and lead agents to act and think along prescribed lines – models of classroom management; models of learning instruction that exclude teachers and enable individual students to learn at their own pace and in their own fashion; models of conflict resolution and peer support, such as supervision and mentoring schemes; comparisons made by translating learning outcomes to numbers (Moos et al. 2015b).

Diverse Visions of Education

At present we see two dominant orientations or visions of education: one emerged from the welfare state model and may be called the ‘deliberation orientation’. The other is attached to the competitive state, and we will call the ‘outcomes orientation’. As has been already described, over the past two to three decades links have been constructed because of international competition in the global marketplace. Thus, education is intended to provide for a good position in the global race as constructed by international comparisons such as the PISA: In order to be competitive, education needs to produce students with high levels of attainment outcomes. Therefore, education is being constructed along ‘management-by-objective’ lines: The principal (the government) draws up the aims and measures the outcomes, while schools, teachers and students need to learn the correct answers to test questions. Very often, the curriculum that is developed in this situation is a scientific curriculum: experts know how to attain their politically administrative ends, and they describe every step in detail, for schools, teachers and students to follow. In this orientation there is a focus on ‘back to basics’ and skills, because those are what may be easily measured.

Core elements of the criticism of the foregoing orientation is, write (Blossing et al. 2013) firstly that the idea of curriculum objectives, originating from (among others) Franklin Bobbitt (1924); second, the conception of ‘learning outcomes’ as objectively measureable; and third, the technological means-end model formulated by Ralph Tyler (1949). These three elements have contributed to seeing education as an end rather than a process, as Dewey proposed; they serve as important tools in the neo-liberal governance systems that have been developed since the 1990s, across the world.

The first orientation, democratic Bildung for deliberation, has been an important vision in Nordic educational systems since WWII. Both education orientations have longer historical roots, but policies and practices have been located in the periods mentioned. The descriptions of the outcomes orientation is closely linked to the construction of the neo-liberal competitive state of the marketplace. The logic and theories governing this orientation are a good fit with the basic economy and management logic of the general governance. The description of the alternative, the democratic Bildung, it based on another kind of understanding of the needs of societies and agents: We need to develop democratic systems, thinking and practices, in order to develop sustainable societies (Moos 2011) that are able to survive the current economic and technocratic dominance. It is a normative choice, based on educational values and not on economic needs, but then, education is normative at its very core.

Democratic Bildung for Deliberation: The Core of Education and Schooling

When we discuss education in a more educational/pedagogical way, we often use terms that are related to the intentions of education, rather than to the functions of schools (Moos 2003).

Educational functions are rarely explicit. Educational functions are effects of the educational system being one of the state institutions that is responsible for socializing (or forming) children to become well-functioning citizens in the society in which they are being brought up. Educational systems have this dual function: on the one hand, they further the optimal development of children's competence, and on the other hand, they teach them to be effective, well-functioning citizens. In this way, educational systems have always played a part in societal governance, which is about both building structures and institutions to maintain the dominant culture, and socializing citizens to willingly cooperate in this effort.

Educational intentions are reflected in a society's culture, in the formal objectives of educational institutions, and they are examined by educational theories. In Denmark, the intentions of the educational system are set out in Article 1 of the Act on the Folkeskole (1993, 2000), which states:

The school shall prepare the students for active participation, joint responsibility, rights and duties in a society based on freedom and democracy. The teaching of the school and its daily life must therefore build on intellectual freedom, equality and democracy. (authors translation)

In the Nordic countries, the foregoing means that teachers and principals must be aware of the socio-cultural environment and the learning conditions. Thus, students should not only be taught how a democratic society functions at a structural level (parliament, government, system of justice, police, and so on), they should themselves experience and live a democratic life, even at school. This means that not all methods of instruction or teacher behaviour are considered appropriate.

According to educational theory devised and discussed on the Continent in the historical epoch called Modernity (starting in the late eighteenth century), education is basically the responsibility of every generation to educate the next generation to be able to live in their society (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Dietrich Benner, to mention key French and German figures). In this discussion, I build on the work of Alexander von Oettingen (2001). Children depend on their parents to educate them, as they are born 'prematurely': they are born into a 'not-yet-condition'. In other words, they are not able to grow and survive without assistance from the older generations. Humanity depends on one generation of human beings educating the next generation of human beings (Uljens and Ylimaki 2017).

Education includes the acquisition of skills and proficiency, the assimilation and construction of knowledge, and the development of motives and values. It involves what is traditionally called subject content and liberal education, in German, 'Bildung'. Children must learn to become human beings, and therefore they must be

educated so that they are able to function on their own in their culture and society. They cannot go on living with their parents forever, but must leave their childhood homes, and make a living and start families of their own. As these theories were devised in the ‘Age of Enlightenment’, they build on a concept of society – or rather, a vision of society – as enlightened and democratic. Therefore, the ideal human being, the goal of education, was the participating, democratically-minded citizen who was willing and able to be a qualified participant in the community and in society.

The debate on Democratic Bildung is still vivid in the Nordic and Danish contexts. In 1976 the Norwegian philosopher Jon Helleenes formulated an often-quoted differentiation between conditioning and liberal education as two forms of socialization:

Affirmative education reduces humans to objects for political processes which they do not recognize as political; a conditioned human being is thus more an object for direction and control than a thinking and acting subject.

Non-affirmative education means that people are socialized into the problem complexes pertaining to the preconditions for what occurs around them and with them. Educational socialization emancipates humans to be political actors. (Fedotova 2014; Helleenes 1976)

The ideal of liberal education, ‘Bildung’, is to educate human beings to be authoritative, competent and autonomous. In the Danish debate it has been called ‘action competent’: the individual is willing and able to be a qualified participant (Jensen and Schnack 1994). This ideal created a fundamental paradox, which has occupied theorists and practitioners ever since:

How is it possible – through external influence – to bring human beings to a state where they are not controlled by external influences?’ (Leonard Nelson, 1970 in Oettingen 2001, p. 9)

This has been a fundamental question for all the educational theorists mentioned, and for many more. We know from experience that children are not able to take care of themselves; they must be educated. Parents educate children and they leave it to schools and other institutions to educate them on their behalf. Thus, education is an external influence that is somehow able to bring about a liberal education, a Bildung or educational socialisation. In principle, there are two agents in education: the child and the teacher. The questions are, what are the pre-existing conditions of the child, and what can the teacher do to further education for Bildung, for authority and autonomy?

According to Oettingen (2001), Rousseau, Kant, Schleiermacher, Herbart and Benner point to two fundamental principles in overcoming the paradox: the ‘Bildsamkeit’ of the child and the request for ‘self-reflection’. ‘Bildsamkeit’ is difficult to translate into English, but it means the fundamental, innate ability (and willingness, I would add) to be open-minded and to participate in a shared praxis. The concept acknowledges the child’s ‘not-yet-condition’ – it has not yet become what it is going to be – but it must participate in the educational interaction in order to become human.

'*Self-reflection*' means that the self is able to focus its attention on something in the outer world and at the same time, on itself. This ability (and, again, willingness) enables the human being to act and to reflect on their actions, and thereafter initiate other actions. Therefore, educators should encourage children to engage in self-reflection.

When it comes to teacher activities Uljens and Ylimaki (2017) argue that two main actions are pivotal: recognition and summoning the child to self-activity. Recognition means respect, esteem, love and friendship (Honneth 1992), which are the basis for developing self-confidence and self-respect, and those are seen as the basis for learning. Following recognition is the quest for summoning to self-activity, inviting the student to become aware of her/his freedom as a cultural and political being with the option of realizing her/his aims. Thus, teachers may need to invite children to act and reflect in ways for which they are not yet ready, much like parents who invite children to walk, even when observation and experience indicate that they may not be able to walk yet. Focusing on these principles should facilitate the aim of all educational praxis, which is to ultimately render itself superfluous.

This outline of an educational introduction/discussion illustrates the ways in which educational problems and questions have a fundamental bearing on democracy: there is always a question of what kind of citizen a society or a culture wants to educate in the family, in the community and in institutional settings. Therefore, we cannot limit our discussions of education in schools to matters of subject content and curriculum. We must engage in research and debate the entirety of school life, the relations between students and teachers, the relations between teachers and principals and their relations to the local and national communities.

In bringing educational theories closer to practice, Dewey's writing has been a great inspiration. In *Democracy and Educational Administration* (Dewey 1937) he wrote:

What the argument for democracy implies is that the best way to produce initiative and constructive power is to exercise it. Power, as well as interest, come by use and practice ... The delicate and difficult task of developing character and good judgement in the young needs every stimulus and inspiration possible... I think that, unless democratic habits and thought and action are part of the fibre of a people, political democracy is insecure. It cannot stand in isolation. It must be buttressed by presence of democratic methods in all social relationships. (pp 345–346)

Participation Democratic education is (Moos 2014b) described by Biesta (2003) as 'creating opportunities for action, for being a subject, both in schools and other educational institutions, and in society as a whole' (Biesta 2003). Besides the opportunity for action or participation, the most important concepts related to democracy are the critique and diversity, because they give a more precise direction to the concept of participatory and deliberative democracy. In line with this understanding, Beane and Apple (1999), Furman and Starrat (2002), and Woods (2005) describe the central concerns of democratic schools as: (1) the open flow of ideas that enables people to be as fully informed as possible, (2) the use of critical reflec-

tion and analysis to evaluate ideas, problems and policies, (3) the welfare of others and the common good and (4) concern for the dignity and rights of individuals and minorities.

This section is the brief interpretation of schools' ethical accountability. Pursuing goals of this kind has been a major concern for many educationalists over time. Besides the opportunity for action, participation and deliberation, the most important concept related to democracy is the critique, because it gives a more precise direction to the concept of deliberative democracy.

One cornerstone for learning is the capacity for self-reflection, enabling the self to simultaneously focus its attention on something in the outer world and on itself. This ability enables human beings to act and reflect on their actions, and then initiate other actions. So one of the primary tasks of teachers involves encouraging and helping children to engage in self-reflection (Moos 2003).

Deliberation If we again change the perspective from a micro- to a macro-sociological and policy perspective on societies and states – a discussion of democracies – we may be able to shed new light on the micro-sociological analyses. The intention behind doing so is to try to develop links between the trends and intentions in democracies at a societal level, and the discussion of how leaders and teachers, the professionals in schools, can build the practices in schools in ways that are supportive of students' 'democratic Bildung'.

The theories mentioned in the previous section (Beane and Apple 1999; Bernstein 2000; Biesta 2003) demand that it is pivotal to give students voice and that is seen as the opportunity for deliberations in schools. This builds on a notion of a deliberative democracy that attempts to build a connection between liberal and communitarian democracy (Louis 2003).

The basis for liberal democracy is described as a special form of governance, where the free individual is capable of making his/her own choices and pursues his/her own interests and so take care of his/her own life. Another dimension of this kind of democracy is the protection of the free individual, in that it is given certain rights or makes social contracts. In other words, individuals are seen as autonomous, even if they are part of a community and they have formed their opinions before entering the community. They are not bound by shared values, but majority votes are the preferred way of mediating opinions and reaching decisions.

In the communitarian democracy, individuals are seen as partners in social communities, bound by a set of shared moral and social values. Values are generated within the community, and may change over time. Members of a community are orientated towards a set of shared goals, and are conscious of the social bonds. These communities may be the state, or smaller parts of states.

The connection between those two forms of democracy thinking is the deliberative democracy: Both liberal and communitarian democracy concepts see the state as a central arena for all kinds of communities. The liberal concept sees politics as being formed through the complex interplay between agents in different arenas and networks, both within and outside the state. Society is seen as decentred, and political processes may take place in many arenas, within and outside elected bodies,

such as parliaments and city councils. Deliberative democracies are seen as associations whose affairs are governed by public deliberation by its members (Englund 2006). A number of conditions must be met in this kind of democracy: The individual's rights that can be met in that the democracy is representative. The other condition is that the deliberations demand that individuals are able to a high degree of reflexivity and responsiveness towards other members of the community. A basic understanding in this concept is the concept of social identity.

The position Karen Seashore Louis takes is enlightening in this argument:

Many contemporary democratic theorists argue that the most essential element of democratic communities today is their ability to engage in civilized but semi-permanent disagreement. Articulating a humanist voice that calls for respecting and listening to all positions – but then being able to move forward in the absence of consensus – will be the critical skill that school leaders need to develop when the environment makes consensus impossible. (Louis 2003)

The theoretical or philosophical background for this chapter (Moos 2013) is a basic understanding of communication, the communicative rationale developed by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1987). In his theory of universal pragmatism, a communication is seen as being legitimized if it strives for 'the strange unconstrained force of better argument'. This means that the relations in communication aim for mutual understanding with a minimum of domination it in what will always be asymmetric relations in bureaucratic organizations.

The potential for rationality in communication is inherent in communication itself. Thus, communicative rationality refers primarily to the use of knowledge in language and action, rather than to a property of knowledge.

This means that, on one hand, the person who produces the 'better argument' is the de facto leader in the situation. On the other hand, leadership in schools also consists of formal management delegated to formal positions in bureaucratic organizations: teachers over students, principals over teachers and so on.

The principal is of course the formal leader in a school, as teachers are in classrooms. Their position is designated as one involving the power to make decisions. According to the thinking presented here, anybody involved in the communication can influence the decision-making if they make the 'better argument', which refers to the argument that is being accepted as the better argument by persons who are involved in the communication, and who are affected by the associated decisions. This kind of influence is most often positioned in the 'construction of premises' phase or in the 'connecting phase', and these forms may be seen as deliberations or negotiations.

This ideal is often contested in real life, but according to Habermas (1987), this is still inherent in communication itself. Therefore there is a better chance for it to prevail if relations in schools involve communication at short range, where all participants have a chance of being heard, listened to and eventually given influence. Therefore, deliberation is the foundation on which schools may build their leadership, success and development, and thus for schools to become and stay 'self-renewing'.

Conclusion

The vision of education for the competitive state is built on a set of core values or logic: management by objectives and outcomes-based accountability. Proponents of this paradigm often refer to scientific management and the scientific curriculum as core theories (Blossing et al. 2013; Moos et al. 2015b). It is a deeply inappropriate that the adjectives of science are used in this way, as scientific management is fundamentally concerned with centralising the power at one centre, be it the owner, a manager or a government. Similarly, the scientific curriculum also hides the power to decide on the purpose, content, relations and methods of education behind the pretexts of expertise and value-free decisions.

This is only one interpretation of the shift in paradigm in educational governance and education itself. Both paradigms build on a set of a core logic and core purposes that are inseparable: The traditional governance paradigm, the welfare paradigm, advocates democratic equity and deliberation in society and its institutions, while the competitive paradigm builds on central management, managing by objectives and hierarchies. The traditional (Danish and European) educational paradigm builds on individual authority and democratic participation and deliberation for democratic *Bildung*, while the competitive paradigm builds on acquiring basic skills for employability.

It should be evident that the image drawn here takes an extreme view, but that may be legitimised by the argument that only by knowing the extreme can we see and understand the development and the moves.

In this chapter it was argued, partly on the basis of research, that competitive- and outcomes-orientated practices use more social technologies than we have seen prior to their appearance (Moos et al. 2015b). Social technologies can be seen as silenced carriers of power. They are made for a purpose – often hidden from the practitioners – and they specify ways of acting. Therefore, they point into a non-deliberative and top-down steered and managed practice.

School governance, finance and staff management, strategic development, liaising with external partners (parents, community, local authorities, politicians, national level) and educational leadership (of students as well as staff and organisations) are all parts of school leadership. These aspects of leadership cannot be separated, even if they are very different from one another. Ideally, they should be viewed from the same perspective: the education – the ‘the democratic *Bildung* – of students and the leadership of professionals.

The leadership parallel to the *Bildung* of children should not be carried too far, but it may open our eyes to important aspects of educational leadership: if the intention of schooling is ‘democratic *Bildung*’, then the intentions of educational leadership must be to create a climate, a dominant discourse and a community that support the educational intentions. Thus, the community should not be governed by hidden structures and discourses of power, but should move towards transparency of relations, democracy and autonomy. If teachers and other staff are to support children in becoming democratic actors, then they themselves must be subject to transpar-

ency, democracy, deliberation and autonomy. Staff must be treated as agents, not as subordinates.

We argued that teachers should focus on recognition, summoning to self-activity, and students' *Bildsamkeit*. In much the same way, school leaders should focus on recognition of the professionalism and the personalities of teachers, on encouraging to self-activity and a belief in teachers' ability and willingness to be autocratic, in sense-making and reciprocal interactions.

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Chapter 3

Lead Learner or Head Teacher? Exploring Connections Between Curriculum, Leadership and Evaluation in an ‘Age of Measurement’

Gert Biesta

Abstract While ‘head teacher’ is still a prominent designation in many countries, there has been a tendency over the past two decades to refer to those ‘in charge’ of schools with a number of other words, most recently, that of lead learner. While one could say that these are ‘only words’ they nonetheless have a significant impact on how the position, role and responsibility of the head teacher is being understood. This chapter analyzes these conceptual shifts and the impact they have on perceptions, identities and relationship. For instance, the idea of lead learner fits within the ongoing ‘learnification’ (Biesta GJJ, *Good education in an age of measurement: ethics, politics, democracy*. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, 2010a; Biesta GJJ, *Stud Philos Educ* 29(5), 491–503, Biesta 2010b) of educational thought and practice, that educational endeavours are increasingly being understood through a language of learning, learners – and now also lead learners. While the notion of the lead learner suggests democratic and empowering relationships, I will argue – mainly informed by a ‘Continental’ understanding of education (i.e. German ‘kritische Pädagogik’ and Philippe Meirieu’s French educational thought) – for the need to reclaim the idea of the head teacher, in order to highlight that the responsibility of the head teacher is fundamentally an educational one, one that can only be accessed and conceptualized in terms of an updated understanding of curriculum/teaching.

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Introduction

This volume of which this chapter is a part raises a number of important questions about the current climate under which schools in many countries function. Perhaps the most interesting observation concerns the ongoing divergence between three areas of scholarship: curriculum theory, leadership research, and evaluation research. These areas not only appear to have different foci and priorities but also seem to feed differently into educational policy and practice. Whereas curriculum theory on both sides of the Atlantic (albeit in very different modes and forms) focuses on the content of schooling in the widest possible sense, leadership research focuses more strongly on operational questions (again in the widest sense of the word), whereas much evaluation research continues to focus on what we might call the production of educational outcomes and the variables that impact on it – a central phenomenon in what I have elsewhere referred to as the ‘age of measurement’ (Biesta 2010a).

Whereas much evaluation research is closest positioned to neoliberal policies that continue to approach schooling in terms of the outcomes its produces – outcomes that are often exclusively valued with reference to the global economy – leadership research is not entirely free from this either, not least because educational leaders are often seen as the first responsible persons for what it is that schools ‘produce’ in terms of statistics on student performance. From this angle curriculum theory seems to be operating a bit more on the sideline of where the policy heat is. This may partly be the result of the nature of curriculum scholarship itself. Here I do think that North American curriculum scholarship has moved itself much more away from the ‘core business’ of schooling than Continental traditions. If North American curriculum scholarship has morphed into a form of cultural studies which, although not without relevance for educational practice, approaches the question of the curriculum in a rather particular and distant way, much work on the Continent, but also in the UK, has been affected by the rise of national curricula which, at least in some countries, have stifled curriculum scholarship – a situation from which the field is only now beginning to recover (see, for example, Priestley and Biesta 2013).

If one way to understand the intention of this volume is to explore the interactions and possible connections between the three fields – curriculum, leadership and evaluation – then, in my contribution, I would like to explore two of these connections. One concerns the relationship between leadership and curriculum; the other the relationship between leadership and evaluation. I will look at both issues in a slightly more distant manner, as I do not wish to claim any specific competence in the field of educational leadership research. Nonetheless I hope that my observations provide some useful input for the discussion.

Leadership for What?

The first point I wish to make has to do with the relationship between the field of leadership and the field of curriculum broadly conceived. (One question for discussion is indeed how broad or narrow we can conceive of this ‘field.’) That the observations I would like to make are important, was brought back to me by a recent experience and a more general observation. The recent experience concerned an invitation to contribute a theoretical perspective to a book with interview of educational leaders/managers in the Netherlands. I was happy to do so, particularly because the focus of the book was to gain an insight in what motivates leaders who work at a fairly ‘high’ level in educational organisations, that is, often with a responsibility for a number of schools or colleges. The interviews, to put it differently, tried to tap into the educational and professional values of educational leaders/managers.

While most of the leaders/managers were able to speak about what drives them and about what they seek to achieve through their particular contributions to the education taking places in the schools and colleges they carry responsibility for, I was struck by the fact that the language they used to articulate this was predominantly a language of learning and development, including the popular/fashionable idea that education should allow children to develop their ‘full potential.’ Their orientations were generally positive and supportive but, in my view, vague and not really informed by what I would see as a distinctly *educational* outlook. This, as I will suggest below, partly has to do with the impact of the language of learning on contemporary educational research, policy and practice. But – and partly related to this – it also has to do with the role of particular traditions of thinking and doing. And perhaps here I was most surprised, as I had – until relatively recently – assumed that a country such as the Netherlands has a strong and long tradition of distinctive educational scholarship and practice, and I had expected to find at least sufficiently robust ‘traces’ of this. That this was not the case is, I think, also an important issue for this the discussions in this volume.

The impact of the language of learning on educational research, policy and practice is not only visible in the vocabulary I encountered with the educational leaders/managers in the project above. It is also visible in the phrases that are being used to designate those who have responsibility for leadership and management in and across schools and colleges. The most striking change in this designation I have witnessed recently – particularly, if I am right, in the UK – is the use of the phrase ‘lead learner’ as the new name for what in the past was either called principal or head teacher. It is difficult to gauge how reliable Google still is in spotting trends, but when I checked “lead learner” it did generate 27.900 hits, not only from blogs and twitter accounts, but also from school websites – here is just a random quote: “My name is Matt Chappel and I am usually called the Lead Learner instead of Head Teacher because we want to show how important learning is for everyone at Thornhill, not just the children. (...) Thornhill’s vision is that everyone at Thornhill should be a highly successful learner. Out motto is ‘Leading and Learning Together.’

We have one main school rule: ‘Help yourself and others to learn.’” – and job descriptions for what formerly were principals’ and head teachers’ posts. This at least suggests at an anecdotal level that that language of learning has not only permeated the way in which many speak about the educational process, but now also on the way in which we speak about those who carry responsibility for it as managers or leaders. What is the problem here? Let me briefly try to make the point and then make some observations in relation to the theme of this volume.

The ‘Learnification’ of Education The issue at stake here is about what in other publications I have referred to as the ‘learnification’ of educational discourse and practice (see particularly Biesta 2009, 2010a). ‘Learnification’ refers to the relatively recent trend to express much if not all there is to say about education in terms of a language of learning. We can see, this for example, in the tendency to refer to students, pupils, children and adults as ‘learners,’ to refer to schools as ‘learning environments or ‘places for learning’ and to see teachers as ‘facilitators of learning.’ Also the redesignation of the field of ‘adult education’ into that of ‘lifelong learning’ is an example of the rise of the ‘new language of learning’ (Biesta 2006). I would also say that the suggestion that the point of education is that students learn is part of this development, and there are indeed many examples – in national, local and school-level policies but also in descriptions of the task of teachers – that state that the task of schools is to make students learn and that teachers have a particular responsibility in facilitating the learning of their learners.

My point here is not to criticise the idea of learning in itself (although there are further issues that require discussion; see, for example, Biesta 2013), but to highlight the insufficiency of the language of learning as an *educational* language, that is a language of and for education and educators. In its shortest formula the issue is that the point of education is not that students learn, but that they learn *something*, that they learn it for particular *reasons*, and that they learn it from *someone*. The problem with the language of learning is that it is a language that refers to processes that are ‘empty’ with regard to content and purpose. So just to say that children should learn or that teachers should facilitate learning, or that we all should be lifelong learners, actually says very little – if it says anything at all. Unlike the language of learning, a language of education always needs to pay attention to questions of *content*, *purpose* and *relationships*. The danger with the rise of the language of learning in education is that these questions are no longer asked, or they are already taken to be answered (for example on the suggestion that the only relevant content is academic content, that the only relevant purpose is academic achievement, and the only relevant relationship is for teachers to train students so that they to generate the highest possible test scores, for themselves, their school, and their country).

The Question of Purpose in Education Of the three dimensions – content, purpose, and relationships – the question of purpose is the most important and fundamental question, because it is only once we have been able to indicate what it is that we seek to achieve through our educational activities and endeavours, that we can make decisions about the appropriate content students should engage with, and that we can decide how educational relationships can be used most productively and

conducively. As I have suggested elsewhere (Biesta 2010a), what distinguishes education from many other human practices is the fact that it doesn't work in relation to only one purpose, but actually functions in relation to a number of 'domains of purpose.'

The argument is relatively simple and starts from the observation that in all instances of education – both at the 'big' level of national curricula or school systems and at the 'small' level of teachers working with their students – education is always about the transmission and acquisition of some content (knowledge, skills, dispositions), but always also 'connects' students to particular traditions and ways of doing and being and, in addition, has an impact on their formation as a person (either positively, for example by giving them knowledge, skills and connections to networks that empower them, or negatively when, for example, they are being told to 'know their place'). In more theoretical language I have therefore suggested that education always functions in relation to three domains: that of *qualification*, that of *socialisation* and that of what, with a technical term, I have referred to as *subjectification*, which is about the ways in which students can be(come) subjects in their own right and not just remain objects of the desires and directions of others.

If it is the case that all education always functions in relation to these three domains, then it is reasonable to ask from teachers and others who are involved in the design and execution of education to take explicit responsibility for the potential impact of their work in each of the three domains. This means that qualification, socialisation and subjectification not only appear as three *functions of education*, but also as three *domains of educational purpose* – three qualitatively different domains with regard to which we need to state and justify what it is we seek to achieve with our students, and what we seek our students to achieve.

Although qualification, socialisation and subjectification can be distinguished, it is important to see that they cannot be separated or singled out. This means, on the one hand, that even schools that claim only to focus on qualification are still impacting in the domains of socialisation and subjectification. It means, on the other hand, that teachers and others involved in the design and execution of education are always faced with finding a *meaningful balance* between the three domains, bearing in mind that what can be achieved in one domain often limits what can be achieved in the other domains. The latter can be seen, for example, in the negative impact an excessive focus on achievement in the domain of qualification can have on the formation of the personhood of the student (which has to do both with socialisation and with subjectification).

The Need for an Educational Perspective, And Where It Might Come From All this shows why it is so utterly unhelpful to say that the point of education is just to say that students should learn, just as it is utterly unhelpful to suggest that the sole task of teachers is to facilitate the learning of their students. Without specifying what it is that should be learned and, more importantly for what purpose it should be learned, the language of learning is unable to provide a sense of direction to the educational process, which is precisely where its deficiency as an *educational language* lies.

I have been making this argument about the deficiency of the language of learning as an educational language for about a decade and although I do think that I have managed to raise some questions, it is remarkable how persistent the language of learning appears to be and, referring back to the anecdotes with which I opened this section, how it has also permeated the discourse and practice of educational leadership. There may, of course, be something attractive about the language of learning. It is generally (but mistakenly in my view; see Biesta [in press](#)) seen as an empowering and positive language that can provide an effective antidote against conceptions and practices of teaching as control – albeit that I would argue that learning has actually become a new mode or technology of control in contemporary societies (think of the strange imperative that we ought to keep learning throughout our lives), and also would like to highlight that learning is not just positive and easy, but can also be difficult and highly disturbing (for example when we learn our about inabilities and incapacities, or discover the darker sides of the histories that have formed us). But the problem with the language of learning, as I have shown, is that it provides us with very little direction for our educational efforts and that, in order to gain such direction, we need a much more robust educational language.

Here the point about different traditions becomes relevant, because – and again this is a topic I have explored in more detail in other writings (see Biesta [2011](#), [2012a](#)) – whereas the field of educational scholarship in some countries and settings has developed a distinctive educational identity, in other countries and settings it has not done so. What I have particularly in mind here is the gap between what elsewhere I have referred to as the Anglo-American and the German-Continental construction of the field of educational scholarship. Whereas the latter has generated the idea of education as an academic discipline in its own right with its own forms of theory and theorising and, most importantly, with its own particular interest – an interest in the emancipation of the child, to put it briefly – the former has established education as an academic field of scholarship and research by conceiving of it as a multi-disciplinary effort to study education as an ‘object.’ The key characteristic of this effort is that education is not seen as a discipline in its own right, but just as an object or field of study, and that intellectual input needs to be ‘borrowed’ from ‘real’ disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, history and philosophy. Such disciplines do of course have interesting things to say about education but – as I have argued in more detail in my analyses – they do so in their own disciplinary terms, so that they ask psychological, sociological, philosophical and historical questions about education but fail, so we might say, to ask educational questions about education. The rise of the language of learning can, in my view, also partly be explained through the influence of the Anglo-American construction on educational research, policy and practice more world-wide, particularly through the influence of psychology (although I am inclined to think mixed psycho-sociological approaches such as socio-cultural theory have also contributed a lot to the popularity of the learning perspective on education).

From an *analytical* perspective these observations thus suggest that the ‘field’ of educational leadership and management may have turned away from its orientation on curriculum theory and has been pulled into a much more technicist and

Anglo-American discourse of the evaluation of the ‘operation’ of education towards the achievement of learning and the generation of learning outcomes. The shift is both intellectual and political; it concerns both concepts, theories and vocabularies and social networks and alliances. From a more *programmatically* – or perhaps we should say: interested – perspective these observations suggest that there may be a need for the field of leadership and management to reconnect with curriculum theory (and I am not entirely sure whether I should add ‘broadly conceived’ as I have some doubts about the extent to which contemporary North America is able to generate the kind of educational questions and perspectives I have in mind; in my view what is happening in North America is mainly located in sociology and cultural studies) so as to be able to have a more robustly educational view about what leadership and management should be *for*, beyond the facilitation of learning or the promotion of development, such as the development of the child’s full potential. The problem with the latter idea is that in such phrases it is assumed that everything we are potentially able to do is good and should therefore be allowed out. What is forgotten here is that the ability to do good or do evil are both within our potential – which is why I have argued that the key task of education is actually to interrupt and question the child’s development, and do so particularly with regard to the question whether what the child desires is actually desirable, both for the child and society at large. The task of education is, in other words, not to facilitate and to promote but to offer resistance – a point well made in the work of the French educational thinker Philippe Meirieu (e.g., Meirieu 2008).

If this sheds some light on the connection between leadership and curriculum theory, I now wish to turn to the other dimension, that is, the relationship between leadership and the field of evaluation (including evaluation research).

Education, Measurement and the Professions

One reason why educational leadership and management and education as a field more widely may have turned towards learning and its language, is because of changes in the policy environment in which education operates and functions. As many commentators have shown, education policy in many countries around the world – and increasingly also, we might say, ‘between’ many countries around the world – is caught in a culture (or cult) of measurement that seeks to express and assess the ‘quality’ of educational process, practices, institutions and systems through a measurement of the performance of such systems. Such performance is understood in terms of what the system ‘produces’ – hence the prominence of the notion of ‘learning outcomes’ – and is generally assessed in a comparative way, that is, that measurement is used to identify who performs better and who performs best on a particular standard or set of criteria. One problem in the age of measurement is that this has led to a culture of competition – competition between nations, but also competition between schools and school districts, between classes, between teachers and between students.

The phrase ‘race to the top’ – the name of Obama’s initiative to ‘improve’ American education – nicely captures what is going on here, that is, that education is caught in a race where there will be a winner but also many losers, and that the orientation of this race is that of teaching an alleged ‘top.’ The other problem with the culture of measurement is that much is invested in the technicalities of measurement – the reliability and the technical validity, that is, the question whether what we seek to measure is indeed being measured – but that very little attention is being paid to what I have coined the ‘normative validity’ of the measurement regime, that is the question whether what is being measured is indeed what we (and the democratic question is of course who is included in this ‘we’) value about education. Given the sheer force and size of the global measurement industry it looks like the tail is wagging the dog, that is, that we are in a situation where we are valuing what is being measured, and that we no longer take the time to ask whether we are measuring what it is we value about education. The means are defining the ends, in other words – which, in the definition of Habermas, is a clear case of positivism or, in his term, of ‘halved’ rationality (‘halbierte Rationalität’).

The culture of measurement puts educational leaders in a difficult position because at first sight it looks like measurement contributes to accountability and democracy by giving all ‘stakeholders’ – itself not an unproblematic term; see below – transparent information about the performance of the education system. This is indeed how measurement is often defended, for example with reference to the social justice argument that everyone ought to have access to the same quality education, and hence we need to know how the system performs. (This argument already is spurious in at least one respect, in that it assumes that the ‘outcomes’ that can be measured are entirely the effect of – and hence the responsibility of – the school and the educational system. The shift towards ‘value added’ measuring was an attempt to address this issue, but remains caught in a rather limited input-output logic that does not really, in my view, engage with the complexities of educational purpose as indicated in the previous section.) But is it really the case that the culture of measurement improves accountability and democratisation of education? Is it therefore something that educational leaders and managers should embrace and full support – something they may feel they have to on the assumption that they should have nothing to hide? In recent work I have tried to raise some questions about this development, particularly with regard to the question whether the culture of measurement supports or distorts democratic professionalism (see Biesta 2014). In this section I would like to share some of these insights in order to gain a better sense of the problematic side of what is happening in the domain of evaluation and measurement of the performance of education. I will do this through a discussion of three post-democratic distortions of professionalism in education and related domains and will link this discussion back to the overall theme of this volume.

The Democratisation of the Professions The traditional case for professional autonomy, that is, for the idea that professionals should regulate and control their own work, relies on three assumptions (see, for example, Freidson 1994). The first is that the work of professionals distinguishes itself from many other areas of work

in that it is concerned with the promotion of *human wellbeing*. This already indicates that professionalism is not merely technical but always entails a normative dimension. Secondly, it is argued that unlike many other fields of work, professional work relies on *highly specialist knowledge and skills*, which is one of the reasons why the education of the traditional professions (doctors, lawyers and priests) has generally taken place in institutions of higher education. Thirdly, it is argued that the work of professionals distinguishes itself from other areas of work because professionals work in *relationships of authority and trust*. These three assumptions constitute, on the one hand, a *definition* of professionalism and therefore appear each time a new area of work seeks to elevate itself to the status of a profession. On the other hand the assumptions constitute a *justification* for the special status of the professions and for its system of self-regulation.

The traditional configuration of professionalism sees professions as closed and largely inward-looking entities that, although performing important functions for society, in a sense operate at a distance and even isolated from society. In their traditional set up professions thus largely operate beyond democratic control, either from clients or from society at large. This is most clearly visible in the fact that professions regulate their own functioning with regard to quality control, entrance to the profession – including the regulation of professional education – and, in case of professional failure and misconduct, also the ‘exit’ from the profession. This makes professions into powerful entities that exert power both over their own functioning and over important domains of human wellbeing. The power of professions also helps to understand why relations of authority and trust can easily turn into the unjustified exertion of power and even abuse of power.

The democratic deficit of the professions was fundamentally exposed and challenged in the 1960s and 1970s, partly as a result of client and patient emancipation (for example in the medical domain and psychiatry), and partly as a result of changing conceptions of health and mental well-being, for example in alternative medicine and anti-psychiatry (such as the work of R.D. Laing; see, for example, Laing 1960; Laing and Esterson 1964; for medicine see also Hellín 2002). These developments, which themselves were part of wider protest and emancipation movements at the time (including the student revolts of 1968 and the rise of the anti-education movement in Germany, known as anti-Pädagogik; see, for example, Von Braunmühl 1975), particularly exposed the abuse of power within professional relationships and, through this, were aimed at what we might call a democratic redefinition of the relationship between professionals and their clients. To the extent to which, after the Second World War, many professions became more central in the project of the welfare state (see, for example, Björkman 1982), a further shift occurred from a strict orientation on individual clients and their needs towards a wider concern for the common good. This can be seen as a second democratising impulse where professions increasingly established relationships of democratic accountability with their clients and society more generally.

This potted history of the development of professions and professionalism is first of all important in order to make visible how in the 1960s and 1970s a democratisation of the traditional configuration of the professions was set into motion, both as

a result of a redefinition of the relationship between professionals and their clients, and as a result of the redefinition of the relationship between professions and professionals and their societal environment – something that was particularly connected to the role of the professions in emerging welfare states after the Second World War. Understanding these developments is also important, however, in order to grasp the significance of more recent shifts and changes in professional fields such as health care and education which, at first sight, may appear as furthering the case for the democratisation of professions but which, on closer inspection, turn out to be undermining the democratic configuration of professional work. In this section I focus on three ‘post-democratic distortions’: (1) the transformation of clients, patients and also students into customers; (2) the transformation of a democratic conception of accountability into a technical-managerial conception; and (3) the transformation of professional knowledge into ‘evidence,’ linked to the idea of evidence-based practice.

These developments should be understood against the background of the transformation of the welfare state and the rise of neo-liberal forms of governance and governing. The transformation of the welfare state – which was partly the result of economic crises such as the oil crisis in the 1970s, and partly of ideological interventions such as the conservative idea of the small state (‘Thatcherism’) (see Faulks 1998) – resulted in a shift from an orientations towards social justice and solidarity (the idea of ‘the common good’) towards a view of the state as a provider of a limited set of public services. What neo-liberalism added to this was the redefinition of the state as a regulator of the market of public services, no longer concerned with a substantive and hence political definition of the common good, but with formal notions such as ‘quality,’ ‘choice,’ and ‘the customer always comes first.’ As a result neo-liberal governments no longer see themselves as a key actor in the political debate about the definition of the common good, but increasingly understand themselves as process managers who, through a regime of standards, measurement and inspection, try to secure the quality of the products on offer. ‘Quality’ itself is understood in strictly formal terms, that is as the situation where a particular provision or service meets certain standards, without – as I have already hinted at in the introduction to this chapter – any concern for the question how meaningful those standards actually are. In what way, then, have professional fields been caught up in these developments and how has this distorted their democratic potential?

A First Distortion: From Client/Patient/Student to Customer I have indicated above that the emancipation of clients, patients and students in the 1960s and 1970s not only exposed the democratic deficit of many professions but also resulted in a transformation of professions and, more specifically, a transformation of professional relationships. Clients, patients and students literally made their voices heard in order to make clear that they were not just objects of the action and interventions of professionals, but subjects in their own right who therefore wanted to be treated as subjects of dialogue and not objects of intervention. From this angle it may seem that the recent trend to refer to clients, patients and students as customers and the tendency to emphasise that that in such domains as health care and education

professionals must offer what their customers want, is the ultimate step in the democratisation of the professions – one where those at the receiving end, so to speak, are in total control.

But is this indeed the ultimate step in the democratisation of the professions? I have reasons to doubt that this is the case, and the main reason has to do with a fundamental difference between economic transactions and professional transactions (see Feinberg 2001). Whereas in economic transactions customers know what they want and would just look for a company that can provide them with what they want for the best possible combination of price and quality, a key aspect of professional relationships is that professional not just service the needs of their ‘clients’ but also play a key role in the definition of what it is that their clients need. Clients, patients and students, in other words, do not engage with professionals just to get what they already know that they want. Part of the process is precisely to figure what it is that clients actually need. As Feinberg (2001) explains: we go to the doctor because we have a headache, but we expect that the doctor figures out what the headache is an indication of and what can be done to get rid of it. This already suggested that the redefinition of clients, patients and students as customers is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what professional practices are and what they are about.

A clear example of what is at stake here can be found in the domain of education and upbringing. If parents were only to give their children what they say they want, and never raise the question – for themselves but also in dialogue with their children – whether what their children say they want is actually good for them, it is quite likely that their children will turn into spoilt brats who remain slaves of their desires rather than that they are in a position where they can have a mature perspective on their desires in order to judge which of their desires are actually desirable. It is here that we can locate the specific responsibility of educators, and a similar argument can be made in relation to most if not all professions: just giving clients what they say they want may be utterly unprofessional. Doctors are not just there to give their patients just what they want, but have a key role in finding out what might be wrong with the patient in order then to propose possible treatments. Patients do have a voice in all this – for example with regard to questions concerning the risks and benefits of a certain treatment – but this is always to be understood as a *dialogue* between the experiential expertise of the patient and the professional expertise of the doctor. It is not a process where the doctor simply sells what the patient wants to have.

For precisely these reasons then, the redefinition of clients, patients and students as customers is not a further step in the democratisation of professional work and professional relationships, but rather a development that subverts the unique contribution professionals make. The reason for this lies in the fact that the redefinition of clients, patients and students as customers only puts the authoritarian relationship on its head by giving all the power to the customer. What it fails to see is that real emancipation and real democratisation requires a *redefinition* of the relationship between professionals and their clients where both play a distinctive role in a dialogical process of needs definition – it is not just a reversal of the traditional set up that would make the client/customer powerful and the professional powerless.

A Second Distortion: From Democratic to Technical-Managerial Accountability A second distortion has to do with the way in which a democratic conception of accountability has been replaced by a technical-managerial one (on this see also Biesta 2004). In a democratic conception of accountability professionals are accountable for the quality of their professional action in a direct dialogical relationship with their stakeholders (clients, patients, students, and ultimately society as a whole). In a technical-managerial conception of accountability, however, the focus is no longer on the quality of professional action. Rather professionals are held accountable for the degree in which their actions meet certain standards. The role of the state in this set up, as already alluded to, is to guarantee the quality of the 'product' delivered by the professions. But it does not do so by engaging in a substantial political discussion about what, for example, good mental health care or good education ought to be, but by formulating standards and by initiating systems of inspection and control that need to make sure that professionals services meet the standards. The question of the normative validity of the standards is hardly ever discussed, or is brushed aside as 'ideological.' What happens as a result of this is the creation of a gap between professionals (redefined as providers) and their clients (redefined as customers). In this gap we find a whole machinery of often privatised quality controllers and inspectors, which means that the accountability relationships between professionals and their clients are no longer direct but have become indirect.

This is another example of what, at first sight, seems to further the democratisation of the professions but what, on closer inspection, turns out to be an erosion of the possibility for substantial democratic dialogue between professions/professionals and their clients. In her Reith lectures on accountability Onara O'Neill (2002) has shown in much detail what goes wrong here. She reveals two important shifts in the rise of the technical-managerial approach to accountability. The first has to do with a shift with regard to the different parties involved in accountability processes. She writes:

In theory the new culture of accountability and audit makes professionals and institutions more accountable to the public. This is supposedly done by publishing targets and levels of attainment in league tables, and by establishing complaint procedures by which members of the public can seek redress for any professional or institutional failures. But underlying this ostensible aim of accountability to the public the real requirements are for accountability to regulators, to departments of government, to funders, to legal standards. The new forms of accountability impose forms of central control – quite often indeed a range of different and mutually inconsistent forms of central control. (O'Neill 2002)

A second shift has to do with definitions of quality. Here she writes:

In theory again the new culture of accountability and audit makes professionals and institutions more accountable for good performance. This is manifest in the rhetoric of improvement and raising standards, of efficiency gains and best practice, of respect for patients and pupils and employees. But beneath this admirable rhetoric the real focus is on performance indicators chosen for ease of measurement and control rather than because they measure accurately what the quality of performance is. (O'Neill 2002)

O'Neill's observations thus clearly show the difference between a democratic and a technical-managerial approach to accountability and the slippery slope between the two.

A Third Distortion: From Professional Knowledge to Evidence-Based Practice The third arena in which the democratisation of professionalism has been distorted has to do with the way in which professional judgement in a range of different professional domains is increasingly being replaced or pushed out by a demand for an evidence-based approach (for more detail see Biesta 2007, 2010b). The idea here is that professional action can only become really professional if it is no longer based on the singular insights (or according to some: subjective opinions) of professionals, but when it becomes based upon secure scientific knowledge about 'what works.' And the claim is that the *only* way in which we can be certain that a professional intervention 'works' is by means of randomised controlled trials – in the literature known as 'golden standard' – which has even led to situations where professionals are prevented from doing anything unless there is positive evidence that their interventions will work.

While proponents of evidence-based approaches claim that professional fields such as education, social work and care can be improved dramatically if they opt for the evidence-based approach which, so it is claimed, has been the main driver of progress in such fields as agriculture and medicine (see for this particular argument Slavin 2002), there are a number of reasons why the idea of 'what works' is actually not that easily incorporated. One key issue is that in domains such as care and education – although this ultimately also holds for agriculture and medicine – the question can never simply be about 'what works' but always needs to be phrases as the question 'What works for what?' The point is, that any idea of 'working' always needs to be understood in relation to the aim or aims of professional action in a particular field. This already shows that the question of 'what works' can, at most, be relevant with regard to the means of professional action, but not with regard to the ends.

The more important point with regard to the question whether the idea of an evidence-based approach makes sense in domains of professional action has to do with the fact that all professional action takes place in what Aristotle already distinguished as the domain of the 'variable' (see Aristotle 1980), the domain of actions and possible consequences, and not in the domain of the 'eternal,' that is, the domain of cause-effect relationships. One reason for this lies in the fact that professional action takes place between human beings who never appear just as objects of intervention – which also shows that the language of intervention is actually quite misleading – but always also as subjects in their own right. In the domain of the variable research can at most provide us with information about *possible* relationships between actions and consequences. But research can never guarantee that relationships between actions and consequences that were found in the past will appear in exactly the same way in

the present. While research therefore can tell us what in a concrete situation and under specific circumstances *has worked* in the past, it can never tell us what *will work* in the present or the future. Next to the need to make judgements about the ends of professional action, we therefore also always need judgement about how to act – which is a judgement about the application of general and decontextualized knowledge to concrete situations and singular cases. Scientific evidence can neither replace judgements about how to act, nor can it replace judgements about the aims and ends of professional action – and where we find claims that it can or should, we have an example of positivism, where the means are defining the ends, rather than that we are in a position to define the ends of our actions ourselves.

The call, and in some cases even the blunt demand to work in an evidence-based way thus appears as an attempt to eradicate professional judgement with regard to the ‘how’ and the ‘what for’ of professional action from the domain of professionalism. It seeks to transform professions into abstract ‘machines’ in which reflection and judgement are seen as a weakness rather than as an essential part. This shows how the call for an evidence-based approach is not a deepening of the knowledge and judgement of professionals, but rather an attempt to overrule such knowledge and judgement. In precisely this sense the evidence-based approach is another erosion of the democratic dimension of professionalism and hence another post-democratic distortion.

The Role of Measurement If the above provides us with an insight into the ways in which recent developments in professional fields such as education are hindering rather than enhancing their democratic potential, there is the additional question how the culture of measurement is contributing to this. With regard to this question I wish to make two observations. Firstly I wish to argue that with regard to each distortion there is a need for data, information and measurement. After all, to give customers what they want and to give the choice and value for money they need data about the quality of the products on offer. Also: to hold professionals accountable for the quality of their performance we need data about the degree to which their work meets pre-set standards. And in order to make professional activity evidence-based there is a need for data about what works, particularly data that show correlations (if not causal connections) between ‘interventions’ and ‘outcomes.’

We can say, therefore, that the culture of measurement has played and continues to play a key role in the post-democratic transformation of the professions. But it is not only that the transformations *require* data and measurement. At the very same time the availability of data, information and measurement *reinforce* these particular distortions rather than that they work against them. After all, once there are data available about the performance of individuals, groups or systems, it becomes increasingly difficult not to look at the data. Similarly, once there are data about the performance of individuals, groups or systems, it is difficult not to include them in any accountability exercise. And once some kind of apparent ‘evidence’ has been constructed about particular practices and ways of working, it becomes again difficult not to make use of it. The availability of data, information and measurement, to put it differently, is seductive and difficult to resist – which reveals another dimen-

sion of the social psychology of the culture of measurement and provides a further explanation for its attractiveness and ‘force.’

Reclaiming a Space? If my analysis of the distortions of professional fields such as education is sufficiently adequate, one question it raises is whether it is possible to regain a space for professional action – which is important for teachers but also for educational leaders and managers. There are (at least) three dimensions to this. The first is to challenge, interrupt and resist the redefinition of the professions, particular with regard to the three distortions I have discussed above: the redefinition of the client/patient/student as a customer; the replacement of democratic accountability with technical-managerial accountability; and the attempt to replace professional knowledge with evidence about ‘what works.’ In each case it is particularly important to show that these developments are based on a misunderstanding of what professional work is about.

Secondly it is important to expose the democratic deficit of these developments, that is, to show that in spite of what may seem to be the case at first sight, they are actually undermining and eroding the development of more democratic ways of working in professional fields such as health care and education. For this it is important to highlight that democratisation of the professions is not a matter of reversing the positions of the involved parties, that is, just turning authoritarian relationships on their head. It rather requires the establishment of new relationships between professionals and their clients – relationships of dialogue where both can contribute their particular experience and expertise, acknowledging that the experience and expertise of each of the parties involved (professionals and clients) is different and complementary, and that the differing contributions from all are needed in order transform authoritarian into democratic professional relationships.

To resist post-democratic transformations of dimensions of professional work, and to insist on the need to transform relationships rather than just reverse them, often means that one finds oneself defending ideas and positions that, at first sight, may look outdated. For example to argue against the ‘learnification’ of education, that is, against a conception of education that puts the learner at the centre and sidelines the teacher, and, in response, to make a case for the importance of teaching and the teacher (Biesta 2012b) – and also for the head teacher – is often perceived as a step back rather than a step forward. So it needs careful argumentation to show that the turn towards the learner and away from the teacher is actually an inadequate response to authoritarian forms of teaching as control, as it only reverses the position of the student and teacher, rather than that it seeks to transform the nature of their relationship. Similarly: to argue that education should be understood as value-based rather than evidence-based (Biesta 2010b), is often perceived as a return to a pre-scientific age rather than as an attempt to show that science – in the form of evidence or otherwise – can never do away with the need for judgement in education.

The Importance of an Educational Perspective At this point I come to a similar conclusion as the one I reached in the previous section because when we consider how educational leaders and managers are caught up these developments, it becomes again important on the one hand to understand – analytically – what has happened and why it has happened and, on the other hand – programmatically – to identify what kind of resources might be needed in order to regain a sense of professional control within these developments rather than to constantly being pushed in the position of being the servant or executor of other people's ideas – which is one way to think about how educational leaders and managers have become positioned in the culture of measurement. Perhaps to put it briefly – as a point for discussion – this analysis points again in the direction of the question whether those who play a key role in the design and enactment of education have access to educational ways of understanding what education is about (and I apologise for the multiple appearance of the word 'education' in this sentence) or whether the only discursive resources they have are policy resources and a language of learning and development. To see how much effort is needed to make clear that teaching is a normative profession – a profession crucially built around the exercise of educational judgements – and not a technicist endeavour; to counter the influx of competence-based conceptions of teaching and teacher education that keep forgetting to engage with the question what all these competencies are for, that is, what they are supposed to bring about, indicates, even on anecdotal evidence, that the main stream of education – as practice, and as research – has lost contact with resources that have been central in (some) traditions of curriculum theory and wider educational scholarship. For a strong, self-confident *educational* profession the connection with these traditions remains important.

In Conclusion

Having put quite a lot 'on the table,' let me be brief in my conclusions. I have tried to analyse developments in relation to two aspects of the triangle proposed by the editors of this volume – the triangle being composed of curriculum, leadership and evaluation. On the one hand I have explored connections between leadership and curriculum directly, which I did through a critique of the language of learning and an argument in favour of the educational forms of theory and theorising. It may be that many leaders and managers have insufficient access to these – either because they have themselves been educated within traditions of thought and practice in which such perspectives were not present, or because they have lost touch with them as a result of the pressures of a more global culture of measurement. This is the other dimension of the triangle I have explored, that is, how the culture of measurement – which includes a particular way to 'evaluate' the 'quality' of education – impacts on education and on the room for manoeuvre educational professionals, including leaders and managers have. Here again I suggested that one important precondition for countering the distortions that I think are still going on in education

is to re-engage with vocabularies and discursive resources that keep education away from production metaphors and consumerist and technicist thinking and doing. Let's cautiously and provisionally conclude, therefore, that there may be a case to turn educational leadership and management – both as practice and as field of scholarship – 'back' or in the direction of curriculum theory, particularly those forms of theory that are informed by and built upon educational forms of theory and theorising. If my contribution reaches this conclusion in a more abstract sense – generalising rather quickly across a number of national contexts and settings – one interesting question is what might become visible in more detailed comparative studies, that some of the other contributions to this volume will provide us with.

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Chapter 4

Against the Epistemicide. Itinerant Curriculum Theory and the Reiteration of an Epistemology of Liberation

João M. Paraskeva

The world of science has lost one of the most eminent figures and the race from which he sprang an outstanding member in the passing of Dr. George Washington Carver

Haber (1970, p. 104)

Abstract Echoing Ettore Scola metaphor “Bruti, Sporchi & Cativi”, this chapter challenges how hegemonic and specific (or so called) counter hegemonic curriculum platforms – so connected with Western Eurocentric Modernity – have been able to colonize the field without any prudence to “fabricate” and impose a classed, raced and gendered philosophy of praxis, as unique, that drives the field to an ideological surrealism and collective suicide. Such collective suicide framed by a theoretical timesharing unleashed by both dominant and specific counter dominant platforms that tenaciously controlled the circuits of cultural production grooms the field as a ghetto, flooded with rudeness, and miserable ambitions, a theoretical caliphate that wipes out any episteme beyond the Western Eurocentric Modern terrain, insolently droving to sewage of society the needs and desires of students, teachers and the community.

Drawing from key decolonial thinkers, this chapter examines the way Western eugenic curriculum of modernity created an abyssal thinking in which ‘this side’ of the line is legitimate and ‘the other side’ has been produced as ‘non-existent’ (Sousa Santos B, *Another knowledge is possible*. Verso, London, 2007). The paper suggests the need to move a post-abyssal curriculum that challenges dominant and counter dominant traditions within ‘this side’ of the line, and respects ‘the other’ side of the line. The paper challenges curriculum studies to assume a non-abyssal position one that respects epistemological diversity. This requires an Itinerant Curriculum Theory

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(Paraskeva JM, *Conflicts in curriculum theory: Challenging hegemonic epistemologies*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2011), which is a commitment and a ruthless epistemological critique of every existing epistemology.

Contrary to the nineteenth century in which, according to Marx and Engels (2012 [1848]) “a spectre [was] haunting [the Western civilization] – the spectre of communism [and that] all the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre – Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies,” at the end of the twentieth century beginning of the twenty first century, Western civilization is facing not just one a complex multiplicity of spectres. One of those is without a doubt the ‘return of the repressed.’ Although Eagleton (2011) and others are so right when they challenge the reductionist (and cheap) critic on Marx’s framework, the truth of the matter is that ‘the return of the repressed’ cannot be explain historically as just a ‘history of class struggles’ since it is not just a political phenomenon. The field of curriculum studies here in the US and elsewhere cannot ignore these well-established conundrums.

Approaches, such as those of Mahbubani (2004), Sayyid (2015) or Haber (1970), testify to the importance of rethinking the way(s) internationalization debates have colonized the field – an issue that has caught the attention of many scholars in crucial settings, such as the American Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies. Sayyid’s (2015) *Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islam* examines how modernity metamorphoses – anti, post, high, late, counter – sweats full blast European nihilism in addressing the complex problems that were created by modernity. He (2015) claims:

Of the many spectres that have haunted western civilization from time to time, perhaps none is so perplexing or so irredeemably strange as the contemporary resurgence of Islam. The spectral nature of this phenomenon arises not only from the way its emergence conveniently coincides with the approach of the witching hour of the second Christian millennium, but also from the way in which the Muslim presence for the West has tended to be grounded in a ‘hauntology’ which finds it all too easy to conflate Muslims and ghosts. (p. 1)

While we are clearly facing a massive political issue, it is needless to add that such re-emergence “doesn’t take only a political form” (Sayyid 2015, p. 4). The rise of such systematically repressed and in too many occasions – as history documents – butchered Islamic and other non-western civilizations goes hand in hand with the eugenic politics and praxis perpetrated by Western ideological apparatuses – such as ‘the curriculum’ – so well documented by Haber’s (1970) *Black Pioneers of Science and Invention*.

Haber (1970) documents “significant contributions made by black scientists and inventors who were pioneers in various fields of science and the roles they played in the development of scientific progress in the United States” (p. vii). From inventors such as the genius Matzeliger (1852–1889) to whom “the modern shoe industry in [the US] and in the world is based upon his revolutionizing invention” (Haber 1970, p. 36) that was “patented on March 20, 1883” (Haber 1970, p. 46), to the “George

Washington Carver Agricultural Chemist” (Haber 1970, p. 104), to “Garrett Morgan’s Breathing helmet, patented on October 13, 1914” (Haber 1970, p. 93), ‘another history’ comes to the surface thus putting into question the knowledge that has been labeled as official bringing laudably to the fore the need to dismantled such curriculum epistemicide (Paraskeva 2014, 2016a).

Mahbubani’s (2004) *Can Asians Think?* is a graphic example of the real color of what Mignolo (2013) and others frame as coloniality. He (2004) argues that “judging from the record of Asian societies over the past few centuries,” Asians cannot think (p. 11); that is, societies “that take centuries to wake up cannot be said to think very well. It would be foolish for any Asian to deny [such] painful historical fact” (Mahbubani 2004, p. 11). Unfortunately, Mahbubani (2004) is not alone in such ideological statement. First, Mahbubani (2004) detached the history of colonialism and neocolonialism from a social constructed so-called darkness that drove non-Western society to tough times in ‘waking up’ to use his own expression. In so doing, he also produces a specific eugenic historicity of history, one that denies irrefutable evidence of how inaccurate his claim is. Second, in so doing, Mahbubani (2004) not only strips such darkness from coloniality and its consequences. Such impossibility of wake up, according to him (2004), is due to the very Asian DNA that is devoid of any capacity to produce thinking and not a consequence of sanguinary centuries of imperial oppression. Such eugenic claim nulls any possibility of the oppressed to repel the oppressor and oppressed forms and to put themselves in a decolonial imaginary path (Perez 1999). Third, ignoring that right during the heyday of Enlightenment, “a number of prominent European political thinkers attacked imperialism not only defending non-European peoples against the injustices of European imperial rule, but also challenging the idea that Europeans had any right to subjugate, colonize, and ‘civilize’ the rest of the world” (Muthu 2003, p. 1).

As I have examined in other contexts (Paraskeva 2011, 2014, 2016a, b) Mahbubani (2004) and analyses such as his undermine that “to write about history is to write about of the lapses of history itself, of spaces blanked out by ruthless whiteness” (Young 2001, p. 1). Put it this way, “history is never is never for itself, it is always for someone” (Jenkins 1991, p. 21). Understanding Western Eurocentric history and its historicity as flooded by silences is perceiving not just the very color of coloniality, but also how such color was constructed right at the outset of colonialism. In 1670, Mbembe (2014) argues, “the big issue was how to create the conditions for a huge armada of labor to produce commodities from a far. The black (‘o negro’; the other) addressed such challenge” (pp. 42–43). In fact, the black (‘o negro’; the other) is the supreme invention of coloniality. Whereas on one hand, addressed the pressure for free labor, on the other raped Western democracies with an endemic issue; that is, “the fact that no black body arrived freely at the shores of the new world is a irresolvable problem for U.S. democracy” (Mbembe 2014, p. 147) – and one could add Western democracies.

When I was writing a new preface for the paperback edition of *Conflicts in Curriculum Theory: Challenging Hegemonic Epistemologies* (Paraskeva 2014), I remembered that a few years ago during a trip home, I came across an outstanding volume of Ezekiel Mphahlele’s book in a shop in Hillbrow, Johannesburg. Mphahlele

shares daily life stories of ordinary South Africans during the apartheid regime and discusses how such stories were crucial to understanding the complex struggle against oppression, poverty, and harsh inequality. There is a passage in the volume that I would like to highlight: “I want to write; I must write; I should write; I am going to write. This is what I said to myself one moonless night under an inky black sky ... [but] Write what? ... Why should I write?” (Mphahlele and Thuynsma 2011, p.7). With such words, South African intellectuals Ezekiel Mphahlele (known as Es'kia Mphahlele) and Peter N. Thuynsma (2011) begin “The Unfinished Story” in Corner B. Mphahlele and Thuynsma’s questioning invokes for me so many other voices of intellectuals and countless horizons. Suddenly, I imagine a “trilogue” among Mphahlele, Steve Biko, and bell hooks. Biko (1978) would probably answer as follows: “You must write what you like.” Quite rarely would hooks (1998) stress, “I write about work that does not move me deeply” (p. 137). However, Mphahlele would bring complexity to the arguments; one needs to say something to the world, and one needs to have something to say to the world. More to the point, one needs to have *something to say* to the world to be able *to say something* to the world. Mphahlele and Thuynsma insisted:

So much has been written on the Bantu, but I have always felt something seriously wanting in such literature. I told myself there must surely be much more to be said than the mere recounting of incident: about the loves and hates of my people; their desires; their property and affluence; their achievements and failures; their diligence and idleness; their cold indifference and enthusiasm; their sense of the comic; their full-throated laughter and their sense of the tragic with its attendant emotional sobs and ostentatious signs of pity. What could I say to the world?” (p. 14)

In writing *Conflicts in Curriculum Theory: Challenging Hegemonic Epistemologies* (Paraskeva 2011, 2014), I consciously faced the same challenges. Frustrated, like so many of us, with ambiguities and gaps within the vast and complex critical and poststructural terrains—despite the countless and crucial gains—I respectfully sought to go beyond such approaches and cautiously propose the need for an itinerant curriculum theory (ICT) to address the complex issues that we are all facing under the pressure of a liquid momentum (Bauman 1998), which characterize the current terrestrial globalization (Sloterdijk 2013). Arlene Croce (1998) argued that the critic has three options: “(1) to see and review, (2) to see and not review, and (3) not to see” (p. 16). She actually added a fourth option: “To write about what one has not seen; [that] becomes possible on strange occasions” (p. 16). ICT values not just the need to see and review; in fact, *Conflicts in Curriculum Theory: Challenging Hegemonic Epistemologies* does more than that. It reviews the field historically and addresses certain gains, strengths, and challenges of a particular radical/critical progressive river. By so doing, I claim a future—itinerant—path and justify why we need a critical itinerant approach, while being profoundly cautious about issuing any kind of recipe.

The field immediately reacted to ICT. Such reactions came from different Western and non-Western angles and epistemological axles, through varied informal and formal academic ways. Some were quite positive. Others raised justifiable concerns in particular cases, and others not only completely misrepresented ICT, but

demonstrated by their objections precisely how important it is to challenge the epistemicide. It goes without saying that this is not an adequate space to address such reactions. But, for example, those who claim that I use ICT as an attack on Judea-Christian Western white male hegemonic epistemology—intentionally or nonintentionally—profoundly misinterpret the argument. ICT goes well beyond such notions. Other reactions, again some of them either welcoming and praising the merits of ICT or flagging understandable concerns, deserved attention, and I will likely address these concerns in the near future.

Needless to say, for so many liberals, epistemological differences are terribly inconvenient. Humanized capitalism, tempered with flamboyant forms of multiculturalism, are so dear to them and, in some cases, they are not even prepared to go that far. The problem is that “that far” is not enough. As Dwayne Huebner’s words (personal communication, 2005) remind me repeatedly, “many educators are not necessarily magnanimous individuals—neither open to diverse ways of thought, nor to significant criticism. Welcome to the club.”

ICT does try to say something to the field. It presents new terrains and theoretical situations. ICT participates in the complicated conversation (see Pinar 2000; Truett 2000)—that cannot bend under the yoke of Western academicism—challenging Western curriculum epistemicides and alerting us to the need to respect and incorporate non-Western epistemes. William Pinar (2012, 2013) acknowledged the influential synopticality of ICT in his recent *Curriculum Studies in the United States*:

There are other discourses influential now, sustainability perhaps primary among them. Arts-based research is hardly peripheral ... One sign is the synoptic text composed by João M. Paraskeva. Hybridity is the order of the day. Pertinent to the discussion in that even Paraskeva’s determination to contain in one “critical river” multiple currents of understanding curriculum politically floods its banks; he endorses an “itinerant curriculum theory” that asserts a “deliberate disrespect of the canon” (2011, 184). In Paraskeva’s proclamation, this “river” has gone “south” (2011, 186). That South is Latin America, where we can avoid “any kind of Eurocentrism” (2011, 186) while not “romanticizing indigenous knowledge” (2011, 187). Addressing issues [such as hegemony, ideology, power, social emancipation, class, race, and gender] implies a new thinking, a new theory ... an itinerant curriculum theory. (Pinar 2013, p. 64)

Although Pinar’s reading of ICT is crucial, I would clarify (maybe complexify) that “the” South is not just Latin America. Sousa Santos (2009) is vital here:

The South is metaphorically conceived as a field of epistemic challenges, which try to address and repair the damages and negative impacts historically created by capitalism in its colonial relation with the world. Such conception of South overlaps the geographical South, the group of nations and regions in the world that were subjugated to European colonialism and that, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand, never achieved levels of economic development similar to the Global North (i.e. Europe and the United States of America). (pp. 12–13)

Thus, we “designate the epistemological diversity of the world by South epistemologies” (Sousa Santos 2009, p. 12). In this way, ICT addresses Sousa Santos’s (2006, p. xi) claim regarding the need for a new critical theory, a new emancipatory praxis that needs to be decolonized as well:

Contrary to their predecessors, [such] theory and practices must start from the premise that the epistemological diversity of the world is immense, as its cultural diversity and that the recognition of such diversity must be at the core of global resistance against capitalism and of alternative forms of sociability. (p. xi)

ICT attempts to create an itinerant path to address a problem. In so doing, it faces undesirable yet unavoidable and needed black holes (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). ICT sees the confrontation with such holes as a reassembled set of processes toward a creative and desirable plan of consistency that is only possible by respecting a perpetual itinerancy. Such theory(ist) understands the structure and flows of a given social formation. Its itinerancy allows the theory(ist) to grasp the imposition, certification, and legitimization of particular un/re/coding metamorphoses, as well as the eclipse of so many others. ICT reads and challenges such codes that frame each social formation and fuel the wrangle of the oppressor–oppressed. This is crucial since it allows one to master the complex processes of axiomatization of specific codes within the capitalist society from slavery in the 1400s to the current slavery constructions as de/re/coded flows of an economy and culture pumped by an epidemic of overproduction (Marx and Engels 2012).

ICT is an unblemished claim against dominant multiculturalist forms that are “Eurocentric, a prime expression of the cultural logic of national or global capitalism, descriptive, apolitical, suppressing power relations, exploitation, inequality and exclusion” (Sousa Santos 2007, pp. xxiii–xxiv)—that have been legitimizing a monoculture of scientific knowledge that needs to be defeated and replaced by an ecology of knowledges (Sousa Santos 2003a, b). ICT challenges the coloniality of power, being, knowledge, and labor (cf. Grosfoguel 2007; Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2000); it is sentient in that the “politics of cultural diversity and mutual intelligibility calls for a complex procedure of reciprocal and horizontal translation rather than a general theory” (Sousa Santos 2007, p. xxvi).

Formalizing ICT in my mind, through my writing, through dialogues with others and the wor(l)d, leads me to consider the intricacies of its conceptions and assertions. Yet, its conceptualization and creation comprise a natural complex interaction with the wor(l)d, as was perhaps the case for Michelangelo and Picasso with their art.

When one day Michelangelo was asked how a certain frame was painted, that is, where his idea came from, he answered, “I had no idea. The figure just stood there, looking at me. I just gave it life/birth.” Picasso had a similar dialogue with a Gestapo officer. In occupied Paris during World War II, a Gestapo officer who had barged into Picasso’s apartment pointed at a photo of the mural, *Guernica*, asking, “Did you do that?” “No,” Picasso replied, “you did.” Writing is, Gilles Deleuze (1995) argued, “bringing something to life, to free life from where it’s trapped, to trace lines of flight” (p. 141).

These words of Michelangelo and Picasso also highlight the theory of translation that works through art. Similarly, ICT is a *theory of translation* that attempts to prevent the “reconstruction of emancipatory discourse and practices from falling into the trap of reproducing, in a wider form, Eurocentric concepts and contents”

(Sousa Santos 2007, p. xxvi). Translation is crucial to the processes of coding and decoding

between the diverse and specific intellectual and cognitive resources that are expressed through the various modes of producing knowledge about counter-hegemonic initiatives and experiences aimed at the redistribution and recognition and the construction of new configurations of knowledge anchored in local, situated forms of experience and struggle. (Sousa Santos 2007, p. xxvi)

In *The Struggle for Meaning: Reflection on Philosophy, Culture and Democracy in Africa*, Hountondji (2002, p. 26) confessed his search dilemmas under the supervision of Georges Canguilhem and later with Georges Balandier. Hountondji wanted to examine “all that history of ideas could teach us on the modes of existence of forms of knowledge and the conditions of the transition to science” (p. 26). Hountondji’s ambition was to identify and delimit, within the existing *corpus*, something like an archeology of science and technology and apply it critically to Africa. Hountondji revealed the challenges in pursuing such object of study by engaging in a deep exegesis of Husserl’s approach. Hountondji’s approach is a vivid example of the inner challenges in examining Husserl without jeopardizing Africa as the focus of examination. Hountondji explained that his own strategy was his “struggle for meaning,” which was to “work on the margins [and] to clear the field patiently, establish the legitimacy and the outlines of an intellectual project that was at once authentically African and authentically philosophical” (p. 78).

Examples such as Yacouba Sawadogo, an African farmer of Burkina Faso, who has been restoring the soil damaged by centuries of drought (and desertification) through traditional farming techniques, cannot be arrogantly minimized or eugenically produced as nonexistent or nonscience just because this work cannot be translated and framed within Western scientificity. Western intellectuals need to consciously acknowledge that the Western epistemological platform—both in its most sophisticated dominant and/or radical critical counterdominant perspectives—is insufficient and inadequate to explain and change its own effects (Seth 2011). A new system cannot emerge from the ashes of the old. It is pointless to think about the future solely with(in) the Cartesian modernity model. It is actually hopeless to frame the present within such a dated model.

Western counterdominant perspectives are crucial in the struggle for social and cognitive justice, yet they are not enough. As Sandra Corazza (2002) courageously argued, “we need to start taking seriously the task of a real theory of curriculum thought” (p. 131), one that opens the Western canon of knowledge and is responsive to the need for a new epistemological configuration. Such a journey of belligerent struggles—against dominant and within the counterdominant Western epistemological platform—aims to replace the so-called monoculture of scientific knowledge for an ecology of knowledges. Such ecology of knowledges is

an invitation to the promotion of non-relativistic dialogues among knowledges, grating equality of opportunities to the different kinds of knowledge engaged in ever broader epistemological disputes aimed both at maximizing their perspective contributions to build a more democratic and just society and at decolonizing knowledge and power. (Sousa Santos 2007, p. xx)

As any other theoretical exercise aimed at understanding the educational world in order to transform it (see Pinar 2004), ICT certainly exhibits a latitude and longitude borderless space to deepen certain claims. For example, among many issues, ICT highlights the linguistic imperialism framed by the English language and culture as one part of the genocide. Conscious of this linguistic imperialism as a crucial part of the genocide, ICT allows one to respectfully understand, for example, how “camfrenghish”—“a language used in Cameron cities, invented [and] created daily by the Cameron’s urban youth” (Ela 2013, p. 24)—a language that deliberately violates the linguistic rules of French and English, desacralizes such imperial languages Camfrenghish, in cities such as Yaonde, is the people’s language.

Darder (2012), in her superb exegesis of the political economy of cultural theory and politics, brings language to the core of the battle against eugenics. As Darder (2012) claimed, “the complexity of language and how the students produce knowledge and how language shapes their world represent a major pedagogical concern for all educational settings” (p. 105). Language, Darder (2012) argued, is more than a tool that epitomizes a specific learning theory or the cult of a flamboyant method. The language question intersects other social nonepiphenomenons such as the question of authority, reframing equality and social and cognitive justice. Any critical theory that aims at cultural democracy cannot ignore the power of (noncelebratory forms of) biculturalism as a *poesis* that determines culture and power relations in the classrooms (Darder 2012).

ICT is a claim for a nonstop production of an epistemology of liberation, in the very best way promulgated by Sousa Santos, that rejects the perversity of colonial praxis of dominance based on “the ontic realization of Being” (Dussel 1995, pp. 44–45; see also Dussel 2013) and works based on and through a philosophy that liberates the very own liberatory philosophical posture—real philosophy of liberation that tries to

formulate a metaphysics—not an ontology demanded by revolutionary praxis and techno-design *poesis* against the background of peripheral social formations. To do this it is necessary to deprive Being of its alleged external and divine foundation; to negate fetishist religion in order to expose ontology as the ideology of ideologies; to unmask functionalisms—whether structuralist, logico-scientific, or mathematical (claiming that reason cannot criticize the whole dialectically, they affirm it more[;] they analytically criticize or operationalize its parts); and to delineate the sense of liberation praxis. Only the praxis of oppressed peoples of the periphery, of woman violated by masculine ideology, of the subjugated child, can fully reveal it to us. (Dussel 1995, p. 15)

ICT consciously aligns with the need for an epistemology of liberation that requires the liberation of the epistemology itself. ICT also warns of the need to challenge any form of indigenitude or the romanticization of the indigenous cultures and knowledges, and it is not framed in any dichotic skeleton of West-rest. In fact, it challenges such functionalist forms. Its itinerant dynamic pushes the theorist to a pluri(nonnecessary) directional path.

More importantly, ICT confronts and throws the subject to a permanent unstable question of “what is there to think?” ICT pushes one to think in the light of the future as well as to question how “we” can actually claim to really know the things

that “we” claim to know, if “we” are not ready specifically to think the unthinkable, to go beyond the unthinkable and master its infinitude. ICT is to be (or not to be) radically unthinkable. ICT is a metamorphosis between what is thought and non-thought and unthought, but it is fundamentally about the temerity of the colonization of the non/un/thought within the thought. ICT attempts to understand how big is infinite, the infinite of thought and action. If one challenges infinity, it is chaos because one is in chaos; that means that the question or questions (whatever they are) are inaccurately deterritorialized and fundamentally sedentary. The focus is to grasp that ICT implies an understanding of chaos as domestic, as public, as a *punctum* within the pure luxury of immanence. In such multitude of turfs, ICT needs to be understood as *poesis*. It plays in the plane of immanence. Being immanence, “a life,” ICT is “a life.” Is it a life paced by a *poesis* or a revolution? Yes please, in a full Žižekian way. ICT is a *poesis* that itinerantly throws the subject against the infinite of representation to grasp the omnitude of the real(ity) and the rational(ity), thus mastering the transcendent. Being more *poesis* than just theory (and not because it is less theory), its itinerant position *epitomizes* a transcendent nomadography, which is not transcendental.

ICT challenges book worship (Tse Tung 2007, p. 45). In fact, ICT also encourages us to pay attention to the multiplicity of forms to read the wor(l)d. The verbalization of pain and oppression is quite visible in Africa, for example, in art forms, such as dance and painting. Dance, Ela (2013) argued, in a country financially and economically moribund, is not just a way to face inequality and oppression. It is, he stated, “the very best way to face discouragement” (p. 26). ICT is an attempt to help us to think in another form as a human being. Corazza’s (2002) insightful framework is crucial here as well. As she claimed, and I honestly think ICT addresses her claim, the challenge is to fight against what she coined *assentado curriculum* toward a *vagamundo curriculum*; that is, “to create [or co-create] a *vagamundo curriculum* one needs to question how can one think about the unaddressable, the unthinkable, the non-thinkable of the curriculum thought, the exteriorities, the self different, the self other, the other self” (p. 140). Corazza added the following:

Such curriculum thought is meaningless, a real vacuum, without the effective forces acting upon such thought, as well as without the effective indeterminations that forces such thought [or forms of thought] to think otherwise, differently, through the creation of new concepts required by the real experience and not just by the possible experience, thus allowing new life experiences. [In fact,] the strength of (an)other knowledge, as well as a new philosophy, will be measured by the concepts that it is capable of creating, or its capacity to renew meanings which impose a new framework on things and to assentados actions, shuffle their syntax, and organizing its thought in a clumsy logic. (p. 140)

Corazza’s sharp take equips intellectuals with the necessary extraordinary tools to understand why some African scholars, such as Axelle Kabou (2013), Jean-Marc Ela (2013), and others, justifiably counterargue the Western and non-Western hegemonic apparatuses with the following question: “What if Africa refuses development?”

The definition of development must be seen through other lenses beyond its Western monocultural conceptualization of the needed development for the global

South. Whose purpose does this development serve? What is the cost to those beneath its grinding wheel of so-called progress? In such context, ICT is really a matter of human rights as well, due to its commitment to social and cognitive justice. This is a commitment that challenges dominant multicultural forms, creating the conditions for and intercultural reconstruction of human rights, toward intercultural postimperial human rights that respect, among other issues, (a) the right to knowledge, (b) the right to bring historical capitalism to trial in a world tribunal, (c) the right to democratic self-determination, and (d) the right to grant rights to entities incapable of bearing duties, namely nature and future generations (Sousa Santos 2007).

ICT is a clarion call to challenge curriculum epistemicides by engaging fully in the complex struggle for social and cognitive justice. This is an intergenerational matter of justice, as well. ICT is seeing to rely on Saramago's metaphor. In one of his best novels, *Seeing*, Nobel Prize winner and Portuguese intellectual, Saramago (2007) described pictorially how, with the vote, the citizens of one unidentified country (most likely Portugal) blocked the normal rhythms of daily life. On a typical gray, wet, winter day in Portugal, the huge majority of the population decided to not vote until late afternoon. The narrative explains the gradual panic of politicians who didn't know what to do before such a democratic scandal. Suddenly, almost at the end of the day, the citizens showed up and voted. Shockingly, after counting the votes, officials announced that the majority of the votes were blank. Such political embarrassment was examined and a lot of reasons came to the table, including the unpleasant weather conditions. The government scheduled another election the following week on a very pleasant and sunny day. To national consternation, the results were worse: More than 80% of the votes were blank. The government reacted immediately against such outcome as if a crime had been committed. A state of emergency was put in place; such state paved the way for a state of siege, with intelligentsia spying on citizens, taking them for interrogation, and administering lie-detector tests. The story goes on with surreal examples narrated by Saramago.

Saramago's (2007) *Seeing* is crystal clear for those of us fully committed to the struggle against epistemicides. *Seeing* goes well beyond the understanding of how to use democracy to save democracy. It is a call for a blank vote for those of us committed to social and cognitive justice, not just against the modern Western dominant and specific counterdominant forms that colonize the very way we [can] think but also against the complex matrix of circuits of cultural production so well unmasked by Ahmad (2008), as well as our own very existence in our academic settings. In claiming a "seeing" position, ICT allows us to move on toward a world that we wish to see, a world that was proposed in the Bamako Appeal:

- (1) a world based on solidarity among human beings and peoples, (2) a world based on the full and complete affirmation of citizenship and equality between the sexes, (3) a universal civilization that offers the greatest possibility for the creative development of the diversity in all areas, (4) a world that constructs civilization through real democracy, (5) a world based on the recognition of the non-commodity status of nature, the planet's resources and agricultural lands, (6) a world based on the recognition of the non-commodity status of cultural products, scientific knowledge, education and health, (7) a world that promotes policies that closely combine unlimited democracy, social progress, and the affirmation of the autonomy of all the nations and peoples, (8) a world that affirms the solidarity of the

people of the north and the south in the construction of internationalism on an anti-imperialist foundation. (Amin 2008, pp. 108–111)

More to the point, and, as I mentioned in *Conflicts in Curriculum Theory: Challenging Hegemonic Epistemologies* (Paraskeva 2011), ICT will not please everyone, as I was able to observe in certain academic settings (to be honest, more so in the United States). While there are appeals for a copresence conversation to rub Sousa Santos's (2009) and Pinar's (2004) approaches against each other, it is not a cross-cultural conversation. We actually need to challenge the cult of cross-cultural conversations. Al-Azmeh (2009) helped a great deal here. One needs to radically question the notion of cross cultural conversation,

Not because [one] wishes there to be an eternal incomprehensibility between peoples, or because I wish to promote xenophobia, and encourage ethnic cleansing and correlative acts of barbarism. It is rather because I believe that the notion of cross cultural conversations rests upon an unreflected assumption of the fixity and finality of the interlocutors in this conversation which even at the ends of serious philosophical authors tends to cause reason to denigrate to the tritest statements on common maximums of etiquette. It is the very same assumption of fixity and irreducibility underlying the etiquette of interculturalism and multiculturalism as a form of conservatism etiquette, that [one] sees so apparently paradoxical correlative of the sorts of assumptions about others—other ethnoi, other religious groups—that prepare the grounds, in the realms of conceptions and imagination for the entire range of possibilities extending from the rapturous fascination with the exotic at one extremity, to bellicose dehumanization of the Other and genocidal dehumanization of the Other. (Azmeh 2009, p. 77)

As I discussed elsewhere (Paraskeva 2016b), this project attempts to address many of the important questions that have been raised regarding “internationalization.” It attempts to bring to the fore voices/discourses that have been systematically produced as nonexistent. This project is part of a long itinerant, deterritorialized, decolonial walk, a mirror of a complex dialogue among many of us, a dialogue that keeps targeting major conceptual swamps, such as the following: What does one mean by “internationalization”? Whose “internationalization”? Which language dominates this “internationalization”? Whose voices have been silenced? Whose knowledge has been systematically dismissed, ignored, and produced as nonexistent? I reiterate that an emphasis should be placed on what Sousa Santos (2014) called epistemicides and that I championed in the field as “curriculum epistemicides.”

By championing the commitment to a nonabyssal thinking and defying the eugenic cult of cross culturalism, ICT put forward, along with Mignolo (2000, 2013) and Escobar (2013), and others, *un paradigma otro* that “does not fit into a linear history of paradigms or epistemes [that] runs counter to the greatest modernist narratives [and] reaches towards the possibility of non-European modes of thinking” (Escobar 2013, p. 34).

Such *paradigm otro* frames and fuels the debate of Western modernity within the so-called modernity/coloniality research program (Escobar 2013, p. 33) that challenges dominant perspectives in the study of modernity that could well be framed as “intramodern perspectives” (Escobar 2013, p. 34). Eurocentered Western modernity cannot be dissociated from the quarrel of global-local, and, “as a particular local

history—[it] lays in the fact that it has produced particular global designs in such a way that it has ‘subalternized’ other local histories and their corresponding designs” (Escobar 2013, p. 38; Mignolo 2013).

The modernity/coloniality research project (hereafter MC) conceptualizes such colonial-coloniality momentum “grounded in a series of events [social constructions] that distinguished it from established theories of modernity” (Escobar 2013, p. 38). That is,

(1) an emphasis on locating the origins of modernity with the Conquest of America and the control of the Atlantic after 1492, rather than in the most commonly accepted landmarks such as the Enlightenment of the end of the eighteenth century; (2) a persistent attention to colonialism and the making of the capitalism world system as constitutive of modernity; (3) the adoption of a world perspective in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a view of modernity as an intra-European phenomenon; (4) the identification of the domination of others outside the European core as a necessary dimension of modernity with the concomitant subalternization of knowledge and cultures of these other groups; (5) a conception of Eurocentrism as the knowledge form of modernity/coloniality — a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that claims universality for itself. (Escobar 2013, p. 38)

Such MC frames its research agenda by emphasizing notions such as the following:

(a) modern colonial world system—as an assemble of processes and social formations that encompass modern colonialism and colonial modernities; (b) coloniality of power—a global hegemonic model of power in place since the conquest that articulates race and labor and peoples according to the needs of capital and to the benefit of white peoples; (c) colonial difference and global coloniality—which refer to the knowledge and cultural dimensions of the subalternization processes effected by the coloniality of power; the colonial difference brings to the fore persistent cultural differences within global power structures; (d) coloniality of being—as an ontological dimension of coloniality on both sides of the encounter; (e) Eurocentrism—as the knowledge model that represents the local European historical experience and which became globally hegemonic since the seventeenth century. (Escobar 2013, p. 39)

ICT needs to be seen in such a framework as well. It is sentient of MC, yet it is not exhausted by it. Its itinerant perpetual dynamic creates that incapacity of surrender to a concrete framework. However, ICT attempts to complexify MC. For instance, it does not necessarily “run counter the greatest modernist narratives” (Escobar 2013, p. 34). It definitely runs against dominant modernist great narratives and through some counterdominant modernist great narratives, such as Marxism, for example, and in so doing decolonizes it. However, even in the attempt to smash certain dominant Western modernist great narratives, ICT pays cautious attention to the wrangle of religion, that is, Christianity and spirituality and how such a yarn was/is crucial to the construction of the (non)existence of the “other” (see Ela 2013). In such a sense, ICT is a theory of liberation, a liberation from certain constraints of critical pedagogy, as well, without denying it. Critical pedagogy exhibits particular pedagogical forms

as part of an ongoing individual and collective struggle over knowledge, desire, values, social relations, and modes of political agency[; that is,] critical pedagogy is central in drawing the attention to questions regarding who has control over the conditions for the

production of knowledge, values and classroom practices; [critical pedagogy] is a form of provocation and challenge [attempting] to take people beyond the world they are familiar with and makes clear how classroom knowledge [is] always implicated in power. (Giroux 2011, pp. 5–6)

ICT sees such a “collective struggle over knowledge” as a struggle that today needs to go well beyond the Western epistemological platform. We all stand respectfully in the shoulders of others, and Giroux’s (2011) work helps a great deal. By insightfully framing critical theory and pedagogy as a language of critique and hope and possibility, a critical pedagogy “that addresses the democratic potential of engaging how experience, knowledge and power are shaped in the classroom in different and often unequal contexts” (Giroux 2011, p. 5), he built a foundational field that one can explore in the struggle against epistemicides. ICT is a clear call against the precariousness of any fixed theoretical position. Needless to say, this implies severe conflict, a conflict that was always a part of our daily lives. ICT is the people’s theory, an epistemology of liberation quite sentient that there is no theoretical and/or political incompatibility between Marxist critical impulses and non-Western epistemes. For instance, if one pays close attention to Giroux’s language of hope and possibility and the way that he frames critical theory and pedagogy, one does not see any incompatibility for an itinerant curriculum theorist to rub against other critical Marxist impulses and non-Western epistemes. This clearly implies decolonizing processes within the very core of the critical and Marxist matrix. Isn’t this what Marx actually alerted us to when he claimed the need for a ruthless critique of everything that exists?

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Part III

Curriculum Theory and Didaktik in US and Europe

The present research program aims at bridging educational leadership research, curriculum theory and Didaktik. Further, this program connects to and moves beyond a previous large scale international dialogue, namely that between curriculum theory and Didaktik that was initiated in the end of 1980s. In Part III, chapter authors Walter Doyle, Mariella Knapp, Stefan Hopmann and Tero Autio, consider the impact of the classical Didaktik Meets Curriculum Project in which prominent U.S. and European scholars in curriculum and Didaktik, including one of the editors of this volume, met to consider relationships among these two dominant curriculum traditions. Stefan Hopmann and his colleagues led the project.

Walter Doyle belonged to the core group; thus, we asked him to give us perspectives on the impact of the earlier Didaktik/Curriculum dialogues, including any new relations among curriculum/Didaktik and leadership for the contemporary situation. From Doyle's perspective (this volume), the major contributions of Didaktik to the Anglo-American Curriculum tradition include a more explicit consideration of content as process endowed with educative significance, the transformation of content into pedagogical process, and the enactment of content in classrooms. Doyle, who had engaged with content related questions of teaching since the 1980s, further argues that the Didaktik/Curriculum dialogues changed his own scholarship and inspired many other US colleagues to conduct empirical studies of the relations among content, pedagogical processes, and the practicalities of classroom-level curriculum work. Lee Shulman, who also participated in the 1993 symposium in Kiel with Wolfgang Klafki, introduced pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) in the mid 1980s with, among others, Sigrun Gudmundsdottir, who participated in Shulman's project "The Knowledge Growth in a Profession" at Stanford. Both Doyle and Shulman have later considered how these perspectives relate to leadership.

The Knapp and Hopmann chapter provides a detailed analysis of similarities and distinctions between Didaktik and Curriculum Theory and then describes how this project inspired many empirical projects across Europe, including their own recent study of school leadership as gap management. Knapp and Hopmann remind us that at the time of the earlier dialogues, the American curriculum tradition and Didaktik

differed substantially according to their focus in the core of teaching, the role of the teacher, and relationships between the individual (subject) and society. For the American curriculum, many scholars had focused on how educators align 'programs' to the 'needs' of different students and contexts as well as system effectiveness for achieving an appropriate and common learning. Rather, in Didaktik, central questions revolved around interrelations among content, process, and aims; the aims of education are, thus, internally related to the content and methods.

Tero Autio joined the *Didaktik meets Curriculum* meeting in 1995 and has since contributed to the field. His chapter is a well argued contribution regarding one of the principles advocated in Part 1: curriculum, Didaktik and educational leadership are cultural phenomena that have developed historically. A historical reconstruction is required in order to bridge these fields within different western traditions, the American and the European. Thus, Autio traces the history of ideas, traditions, and shifts in the social-policy context that have affected the role of schooling in the nation state. Specifically, Autio argues that a certain type of instrumentalist thinking and rationality may be identified through the history. He then argues for a reconsideration of this thinking in the contemporary situation, one that more clearly connects curriculum and leadership. In his final part of his chapter, Autio moves beyond the western tradition, and poses a view of educational leadership from a base of Chinese wisdom traditions as well as Western curriculum theorizing/Didaktik.

In a globopolitan perspective, we argue, it is crucial that the western tradition in curriculum studies, Didaktik and educational leadership also is aware of its modern roots and core concepts in order to establish and develop a Chinese-European-American dialogue.

We make two additional points regarding the Didaktik Meets Curriculum project as we introduce this part of the volume. First, in the wake of that critically important project, curriculum/Didaktik studies have also been affected by interrelated movements occurring around the same timeframe in North America, Europe, and elsewhere. Here we refer to the Reconceptualist Movement in the North American context and its later internationalization phase as well as the new sociology of education. In the Reconceptualist movement, by drawing heavily on subjectivity and Bildung thereby challenging scholars to think about curriculum as a complicated conversation, moving beyond traditional approaches to theorizing curriculum. Apple and colleagues theorizing curriculum as cultural reproduction, drawing heavily on transformative sociological perspectives and theoretical approaches which also influenced Scandinavian Didaktik (England). In addition cultural-historical psychology/activity theory significantly influenced European Didaktik and american research on teaching and reframed the US-European dialogue on teaching by offering a shared language including a cultural and an institutional perspective.

Second, leadership received little attention in the Didaktik Meets Curriculum project, Reconceptualist Movement, the New Sociology of Education or in Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), despite the orientation towards developmental work research. Knapp and Hopmann's chapter (this volume) clearly illustrates how the changing context clears the way to bridge curriculum/Didaktik and leadership in empirical work. More specifically, Knapp and Hopmann describe changing societal